Explaining How Human Rights Protections Change After Internal Armed Conflicts

Johannes Karreth [iD][1], **Patricia Lynne Sullivan** [iD][2], **and Ghazal Dezfuli**[2]

[1]Ursinus College and [2]University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill

Abstract

Societies emerging from internal armed conflicts display surprising variation in the degree to which governments protect human rights. Employing new data on civilian victimization by both government and rebel forces, we find that the human rights climate of a post-conflict country is not simply a perpetuation of pre-conflict conditions, or the result of repressive regimes remaining in power. Instead, the treatment of civilians during conflict has an independent impact on post-conflict human rights protections (HRP). Analyses of ninety-six post-conflict periods (1960–2015) show that when governments systematically and extensively target civilians during counterinsurgency campaigns, post-conflict human rights conditions decline substantially compared to pre-conflict levels, even accounting for other predictors of human rights violations, including pre-conflict human rights conditions. This holds regardless of who is in power after conflicts end. These findings have implications for theoretical models of repression and conflict cycles, and for practitioners and policymakers aiming to restore and protect human rights after war.

Keywords: civil wars, human rights, civilian targeting

Following civil war termination, some governments take significant steps to improve human rights protections (HRP) for their citizens. In other cases, even the overthrow of a brutal regime and its replacement with a party expected to advance human rights leads to continued abuses. Figure 1 shows that while pre- and post-conflict human rights conditions are similar in many countries, others experience dramatically improved or drastically worse human rights conditions. How can we explain this disparity in post-conflict trajectories?

Multiple existing studies help us understand how state repression affects the onset and severity of civil war, and some related work indicates how repression by non-state actors can do the same. Relatedly, the literature offers some insights into how repression shapes how civil wars end. Less systematic information exists about how or why repression changes after wars end.[1] Advancing this important line of inquiry, we conduct a systematic comparative analysis of the determinants of human rights practices in post-conflict countries. Human rights violations are objectionable in their own right, but poor protection for human rights also appears to perpetuate "conflict traps" by depressing economic development and generating grievances that increase the odds of

1   We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this language.

Figure 1. Changes in HRP scores from the five years prior to conflict onset to the decade after conflict termination, in close to 100 countries in which there was an internal armed conflict between 1960 and 2015 and for which data on HRP are available
Source: Fariss (2014); authors' calculations.
Note: Years denote the time of conflict termination. Observations below the horizontal line at 0 are conflicts where HRP *worsened* after the end of the conflict. Observations above the line are conflicts where HRP *improved* after conflict ended.

conflict recurrence (Collier et al. 2003; Walter 2015). Acknowledging prior work on variance in social, economic, and political conditions in post-conflict countries,[2] we focus on repression as a consequential dimension of post-conflict governance.

Building on the literatures on the causes of repression and work on civilian victimization during internal armed conflicts, we explore how the targeting of civilians by government and rebel forces during a war might impact both motivation and opportunity to intensify or reduce repression in the postwar environment. Just as internal armed conflict does lasting damage to a country's economy,[3] it can—but need not—worsen human rights conditions in the long run. To explain when this happens, we argue that warfighting strategies that deliberately target civilians hinder the ability of post-conflict countries

to return to the level of HRP that existed prior to the war. We define civilian targeting by governments or rebels during armed conflict as the consistent selection of civilians as direct objects of attack or consistent failure to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants in military operations throughout the course of a conflict. These strategies harden social divisions, intensify the domestic security dilemma in post-conflict countries, and discourage post-conflict governments from creating effective, impartial rule of law. Extensive targeting of civilians affects a postwar government's incentives to violate the human rights of its citizens and the strength of domestic institutions that could constrain leaders from engaging in repression.

Employing new data on civilian targeting by both government and rebel forces, we show that the human rights climate of a post-conflict country is not simply a perpetuation of pre-conflict conditions, or the result of repressive regimes remaining in power following war termination. We provide a possible explanation for some puzzling results in the post-conflict literature. Recent studies have failed to show a consistent relationship between civil war outcomes and democratization. Some scholars find that military victory by the civil war

2   Examples of this literature include Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett (2003), Kang and Meernik (2005), Lai and Thyne (2007), Hoddie and Smith (2009), Jarstad (2009), Iqbal (2010), Meernik, Nichols, and King (2010), and Huang (2016).

3   See Tir and Karreth (2018, chs. 1 and 2) for a summary of research on this point.

government increases the likelihood of post-conflict democratization (Joshi and Mason 2011, 402), while other studies argue that only rebel victory increases prospects for democratization (Wantchekon 2004; Toft 2010). Several find evidence that negotiated settlements are most conducive to the development of democratic institutions in the post-conflict period (Gurses and Mason 2008; Nilsson 2012; Hartzell and Hoddie 2015; Huang 2016). A few studies conclude that there is no relationship between civil war outcomes and democratization (Joshi 2010; Fortna and Huang 2012). Could it be that even after long, costly conflicts in which many lives are lost, it makes no difference which side governs? One of the key insights from our study is that the relationship between war outcomes and human rights practices is conditioned by the government's treatment of civilians during the war. Importantly, the effect of wartime civilian targeting is not just a manifestation of brutal civil war governments that remain in power following conflict termination. While pre-conflict human rights conditions are a strong determinant of human rights conditions after a conflict ends, wartime brutality exerts an independent effect on the human rights practices of post-conflict regimes, regardless of whether those who directed the targeting of civilians stay in power or are replaced by their opponents. In sum, this study proposes that changes in HRP after a civil war are best explained by disaggregating three dimensions: whether combatants targeted civilians during the conflict, who those actors were, and who assumed power after the conflict.

State Repression in Post-Conflict Countries: Motivation and Opportunity

Countries experiencing ongoing armed conflict have significantly higher rates of human rights violations than countries at peace (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994). However, even after a civil war has formally ended, post-conflict societies are characterized by multiple factors researchers have linked to state repression. Although the government may no longer be engaged in open combat against opponents, post-conflict instability and latent violent threats may motivate human rights abuses by government actors. A substantial literature concludes that domestic instability and, more specifically, threats to their hold on power, motivate regimes to employ repressive tactics (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Regan and Henderson 2002). In the immediate post-conflict period, the risk of return to civil war is high and the distribution of power is still in flux. As a country transitions from active conflict to peace, armed groups often continue to

target each other and both government and opposition factions may attack civilian supporters of the other side in a bid for power and influence (Kathman and Wood 2016, 151–3). It can take some time for belligerents who have officially surrendered or agreed to a negotiated settlement to disarm and demobilize, so low-level violence typically persists even after an internal armed conflict has officially ended in a military victory or negotiated settlement (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Boyle 2014).

At the same time, the fragility or absence of domestic political institutions that typically constrain leaders from engaging in human rights violations provides a permissive environment for such abuses. A robust body of research has demonstrated that political institutions, such as independent court systems and separation of powers, can deter leaders from violently suppressing dissent and increase HRP (e.g., Keith 2002; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Davenport 2007; Powell and Staton 2009; Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski 2014). But civil wars severely weaken domestic political and institutional processes (Joshi 2010; Gates et al. 2012). The informal institutions that can constrain state repression—social norms and expectations about human rights and civilian protection—are also eroded during significant periods of violence. Mass public opinion surveys and in-depth studies have found that exposure to violence reduces individuals' tolerance for out-groups and increases the appeal of violence and aggression to pursue goals (for an overview, see Blattman, Hartman, and Blair 2014).

It is therefore unsurprising that human rights conditions are generally poor in post-conflict societies. But research to date does not directly address why some post-conflict societies manifest more severe rights violations after conflicts end, while others move toward greater HRP. In the next section, we link existing work on state repression to more recent research on civilian victimization to theorize about the postwar legacy of belligerents' treatment of civilians during internal armed conflicts.

Civilian Targeting and Variation in Human Rights Conditions across Post-Conflict Countries

Consistent with the extensive literature on state repression, we assume that governing regimes use repressive tactics primarily in order to maintain control over the population and retain office (Gurr 1986; Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Regan and Henderson 2002). Human rights abuses like torture, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings can deter citizens from challenging leaders and decrease the ability of dissenters to

mobilize (Moore 2000; Davenport 2000, 2007). Governments are most likely to engage in human rights violations when: (1) they perceive a need to suppress or eliminate political rivals in order to consolidate their hold on power; and (2) both formal institutional and informal normative constraints on the abuse of civilians are weak (Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Carey 2010; Bell and Murdie 2018).

We argue that civilian targeting during an armed conflict has enduring impacts on the severity of regime vulnerability to domestic threats and the strength of both formal and informal institutional constraints on government repression in post-conflict countries. Warfighting strategies that deliberately target civilians produce vulnerable postwar governments because they intensify the domestic security dilemma that exists after most internal armed conflicts. Armed groups on the losing side of a civil war are often reluctant to disarm and demobilize after conflict termination for fear that the postwar government will take advantage of their vulnerability (Walter 1997, 2002). This fear is likely to be especially intense when civilians as well as combatants were targeted in the fighting. After a brutal war with widespread civilian targeting, the post-conflict government will have difficulty credibly committing to protect marginalized populations or to respect the rights of former combatants and civilians seen as supporting the side that lost the war. Civilian targeting also creates especially deep and enduring grievances and polarizes group identities (Balcells 2010, 2017; Boyle 2014). The persistence of grievances and hardening of social identities can fuel mutual suspicion and violent reprisals, leaving populations feeling especially vulnerable. Populations seen as sympathetic to the side that lost the war will fear becoming targets of former combatants that remain armed, or of the postwar regime itself. In a security dilemma, perceived insecurity motivates civilians to arm themselves and leads armed non-state actors to resist post-conflict disarmament and demobilization initiatives. For its part, the government is likely to see resistance to disarmament as a threat to regime survival, even if the underlying motivation is defensive. When the government reacts to this perceived threat by harshly repressing dissent, it reinforces the cycle of fear, violence, and repression (Posen 1993; Kaufmann 1996; Poe 2004; Carey 2010).

The aftermath of armed conflict between the Ba'athist government of Iraq and Kurdish opposition groups in Northern Iraq during the 1980s illustrates how civilian targeting during an armed conflict can contribute to a self-perpetuating cycle of grievance, mutual vulnerability, violence, and repression. During the war, the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussein purposefully targeted and killed civilians on a massive scale. Daily air and artillery attacks targeted heavily populated agricultural areas. The government's military operations in 1988 killed approximately 100,000 Kurdish civilians (Hardi 2011, 13). In March of 1988 alone, roughly 5,000 civilians were reported killed during the government's chemical attack on the city of Halabja (Kelly 2008, 33; Renahan 2017).

After the war, human rights conditions in Iraq further deteriorated as the government tightened its repressive grip over the population (Human Rights Watch 1995; United States Department of State 1995, 1997). Figure 2 illustrates this development. The brutality of the war and, in particular, the government's chemical strikes on Halabja, generated and hardened Kurdish grievances against the Iraqi government and contributed to ethnic animosities (Anderson 2016). Armed Kurdish opposition groups remained active, retaining control of the Kurdistan region (Simons 1994, 28). The United Organization of the Halabja Martyrs—an extremist Kurdish organization—vowed vengeance against the Iraqi government and carried out terrorist attacks (Stern 2000). The government restricted the supply of food, medicine, and electricity to the northern areas populated by Kurds (United States Department of State 1995); burned Kurdish villages (Human Rights Watch 1993); and forcefully replaced Kurdish civilians with Arab civilians in the northeast (Human Rights Watch 1991, 1993). The government also compelled non-Arabs to label themselves as Arabs (Human Rights Watch 2004). Even pledges by the government to protect the rights of political opponents of the regime and their supporters were generally not credible. The government issued amnesties[4] for Iraqi Kurds and other opponents of the government, but the amnesties were often not honored (Human Rights Watch 1992; Rohde 2010, 38). Many Kurds that did return to Iraq under the amnesty protections were stripped of their economic and political rights and remained at considerable risk for persecution and execution by the government (Human Rights Watch 1993). Some Kurds returning to Iraq under the 1991 amnesty decrees were arrested and executed (Human Rights Watch 1992). The United Nations' special rapporteur concluded that the amnesties were simply a ruse to cover up the government's real

---

4   The government issued a general amnesty to all Iraqi Kurds on September 8, 1988 following the end of the war (Rohde 2010, 38). Another general amnesty for all Iraqi Kurds was issued in April 1990 and subsequently extended until July of that year (Minorities at Risk Project 2004).

Figure 2. HRP scores in Iraq before, during, and after conflict. Higher scores indicate better human rights protection.
Source: Fariss (2014); authors' calculations.
Notes: During the conflict, the government engaged in systematic targeting of civilians (conflict ID in the STAC data: 6451980). The gray area highlights the conflict period. Mean latent HRP scores are shown by the black lines, with a confidence interval (± one standard deviation) in dashed lines.

intention of rooting out members of opposition organizations (Human Rights Watch 1992).

Following from the logic of the domestic security dilemma, and generalizing the dynamics observed in Iraq, our first hypothesis suggests an increase in repression in countries emerging from civil wars during which combatants systematically targeted civilians. Countries in which civilian targeting occurs during conflict will typically be characterized by poor human rights environments even before the armed conflict begins. But we expect that in two cases with comparably bad HRP before a conflict, the country with civilian targeting will see an even worse deterioration of HRP after the conflict ends.

H1: *Holding pre-conflict human rights conditions constant, extensive targeting of civilians during the war is associated with a further decline in the government's efforts to protect human rights after the conflict.*

Hypothesis 1 does not address *who* targeted civilians, but our study design allows us to distinguish between the perpetrators of civilian targeting. We therefore explore two versions of Hypothesis 1: a general and an actor-specific version, as illustrated in Table 1. In the actor-specific form of Hypothesis 1—part (b) of Table 1—we posit that *who* targeted civilians may affect the security

dilemma after the conflict and therefore shape the change in HRP after conflict. It is possible that governments targeting civilians is particularly harmful for post-conflict incentives to repress. Governments possess the monopoly on violence, which implies a special responsibility. Governments are also beholden to international law on the treatment of civilians (specifically Article 13 in Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions). Violating the legal and norms-based prohibition of targeting civilians can erode domestic norms further and lessen constraints on post-conflict governments' use of repressive tools. When governments are not alone in targeting civilians, it is possible that their targeting can be framed as a response to particularly ruthless rebels, lessening the impact of targeting on post-conflict norms against human rights violations. In sum, the special status of governments from a normative and legal perspective may make *governments'* use of civilian targeting particularly detrimental for HRP after conflict.

While Hypothesis 1 anticipates that brutal civil wars engender post-conflict societies with poor human rights conditions regardless of who rules after the war, the extent to which intra-war atrocities lead to postwar repression may vary by perpetrator and government composition (cf. the three rows in Table 1). One intuitive possibility is that human rights conditions will be worst

Table 1. Illustration of Hypothesis 1

(a) general form

During conflict / After conflict	No extensive civilian targeting	Rebels targeted civilians	Both targeted civilians	Government targeted civilians
Incumbent remains in power				
Powersharing / unclear		Further drop in HRP		
Rebels assume power				

(b) actor-specific form

During conflict / After conflict	No extensive civilian targeting	Rebels targeted civilians	Both targeted civilians	Government targeted civilians
Incumbent remains in power				
Powersharing / unclear		Further drop in HRP	Further drop in HRP	**Largest drop in HRP**
Rebels assume power				

when brutal civil war governments remain in power after war termination. Civilian targeting by an incumbent regime during a counterinsurgency campaign indicates that institutions like the legislature and the judiciary that might otherwise constrain the executive and hold individuals accountable for violating citizens' basic rights are weak or nonexistent. Toft (2010, 25) maintains that incumbent governments that prevail over an armed opposition are more likely than rebel-led governments to take their victory as an opportunity to repress supporters of the rebellion after war termination.

Moreover, culpability for war crimes discourages the creation of formal institutions that could constrain the behavior of the postwar government, creating a permissive environment for human rights abuses. When postwar leaders are guilty of targeting civilians during an armed conflict, they should be reluctant to create or strengthen institutions that would hold members of the former regime accountable for atrocities—an independent judiciary, human rights offices, and truth commissions, for example. If these institutions were effective, former victims or current dissidents could use them to take retroactive action against culpable political leaders. Because institutions of accountability for human rights violations are also the institutions that could effectively constrain future human rights violations (Kim and Sikkink 2010), culpable regimes should remain relatively unconstrained. Incumbents who prevail by pursuing brutal counterinsurgency campaigns may tighten their grip on domestic institutions that could constrain their behavior—exerting greater executive control over the judiciary, mass media, and civil society organizations that could serve as

platforms for dissidents to denounce the government's human rights violations during the war.

Postwar Guatemala provides an example of this dynamic. During a war that lasted for thirty-six years, successive military governments in Guatemala pursued a scorched-earth strategy against leftist rebel groups representing the majority indigenous Maya and poor Ladino peasant populations in rural Guatemala (Höglund 2004; Spence 2005). In its 1999 report, the Commission for Historical Clarification[5] concludes that government armed forces committed more than 90 percent of all human rights violations during the course of the war, including 626 massacres against Mayan communities, in what amounted to genocide against the Maya (UN Historical Clarification Commission 1999, 34). Jonas (2000, 24) estimates that between 1981 and 1983, one of the most brutal periods of the war, approximately 150,000 civilians were killed and "440 villages were entirely wiped off the face of the map" by government forces.

The civil war terminated in a comprehensive peace agreement—the 1996 Peace Accords[6]—and the postwar government pledged its commitment to human rights by signing up to several human rights treaties (Human Rights Watch 1997; Höglund 2004). However, postwar governments under the leaderships of civilian-elected presidents Álvaro Arzú (1996–2000) and Alfonso

5   UN Historical Clarification Commission (CEH). *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*, February 25, 1999.
6   Agreement of a Firm Lasting Peace (December 29, 2016). For details, see https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/accord-firm-and-lasting-peace.

Portillo (2000–2004) were unwilling to follow through on many critical reforms despite donors having provided millions of dollars of aid aimed at strengthening the justice, legal, and police sectors (Ruhl 2005; Stanley 2007, 136; International Crisis Group 2012). Under both administrations, crackdowns against suspected critics of the government were widespread. The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINGUA) reported hundreds of human rights abuses, but the government failed to launch investigations into them (Human Rights Watch 2002). Government authorities, particularly members of the military, frequently harassed and intimidated judges, lawyers, prosecutors, journalists, and witnesses (Amnesty International 1999; Human Rights Watch 2002; Ruhl 2005). The National Civilian Police often encouraged or directly engaged in human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch 2002). Instead of curbing the influence of the military, the government augmented its powers substantially by increasing its financial resources and the scope of its activities (Ruhl 2005). Generalizing this experience, we anticipate higher levels of repression when governments culpable of wartime atrocities remain in power after conflict termination.

H2: *Post-conflict human rights conditions will remain poor, or be further degraded from pre-conflict levels, when a government that engaged in widespread targeting of civilians during the war remains in power after war termination.*

A government's targeting of civilians during war could impact postwar repression even if the regime is removed from power. Government brutality can radicalize the opposition and weaken institutional constraints on rebel-led governments. Tactics that deliberately or indiscriminately target civilians generate high levels of resentment and alienate swaths of the population. Violence perpetrated against civilians by an incumbent government may also produce a more extremist opposition by: (1) attracting recruits motivated by a desire to seek revenge for their own treatment or those of loved ones; and (2) increasing popular support for rebel leaders and armed groups that adopt more hardline positions against the government and its supporters (Lichbach 1987). As Daxecker (2017, 1263) notes, "heavy-handed coercion alienates members of marginalized groups from the government, victimizes innocents and drives them to terrorist groups, and radicalizes people already sympathetic to the goals of the group."[7] Several recent studies have found that direct exposure to violence reduces an individual's tolerance for out-groups and increases support for the use of violent tactics (for an overview, see Blattman, Hartman, and Blair 2014). As more moderate leaders and groups lose both fighters and supporters to more radical movements, the opposition as a whole shifts toward greater extremism. Should the opposition prevail and seize control of the government, the leaders they put in place are unlikely to protect the rights of every citizen. The leadership of the newly formed government may have grievances of their own to avenge and will have an aggrieved constituency eager for retribution against supporters of the brutal civil war government.

Postwar Uganda illustrates this. The National Resistance Army (NRA), led by Yoweni Museveni, defeated the government's United National Liberation Army (UNLA) after five years of war beginning in 1981 (Bell 2016). The UNLA, composed mainly of members of the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups, committed the bulk of human rights violations during the war.[8] Under the Presidency of Obote, the UNLA committed massacres and terrorized civilians, driving scores of civilians to support the NRA during the war (Dodge and Raundalen 1991, 51–2; Bell 2016). Civilians, including those belonging to the Baganda ethnic group, were conspicuously murdered, raped, and tortured (Klugman, Neyapti, and Stewart 1999, 25; Toft 2009, 103; Bell 2016). In describing the brutality of the government during the war, Busuttil and colleagues (1991) conclude that Obote's rule "was characterized by military excesses against civilians which are believed to have exceeded the brutality of the Amin era." Estimates suggest that thousands were killed in military campaigns against the NRA (Bell 2016, 500).

Following the rebel victory in 1986, acts of violent retaliation by NRA soldiers against ethnic groups of the UNLA were widespread (Behrend 2000; Bøås 2015; Lamwaka 2016). The NRA killed and tortured UNLA soldiers, including Acholi soldiers (Behrend 2000; Lamwaka 2016, 51). The Museveni-led government also vigorously pursued, arrested, and punished members of opposition parties, former regime sympathizers, and even the family members of political leaders affiliated with prior governments (Amnesty International 1987). A number of armed opposition groups associated with former presidents (including Milton Obote) continued to actively fight the government in the postwar period

---

7   See also Gartner and Regan (1996), Kydd and Walter (2006), Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson (2007), and Piazza (2017).

8   During the civil war, the government under Obote killed thousands of people in the Luwero Triangle during counterinsurgency operations and committed serious human rights violations (Bell 2016).

([Amnesty International 1988](#)). The government cracked down on these armed movements with aggressive screening campaigns aimed at vetting communities for participation in opposition activity ([Amnesty International 2011](#); [Branch 2011](#), 64). The armed forces were reported to have killed unarmed civilians during these campaigns, including hundreds in the Tororo and Gulu districts ([Ofcansky 1999](#), 66–7). Thousands of others were arrested and jailed. Many suffered from abuse and torture while in government custody ([Amnesty International 2011](#)). In recounting the human rights violations by the NRA after the war, [Lamwaka (2016](#), 50–1) writes: "Acholi villagers had never experienced such abuses before, even during the time of Amin…It then became imprinted in the minds of the Acholi villagers that the NRA soldiers were taking revenge on the people for what had gone wrong in Luwero triangle."

In contrast to Hypothesis 2, which expects post-conflict repression to be worst when governments culpable of wartime atrocities remain in power after conflict termination, Hypothesis 3 predicts that human rights abuses will be particularly widespread when brutal civil war governments are overthrown by the rebels. Like the NRA in Uganda, opposition movements that experience civilian targeting by the civil war government will want to punish the abuses of the former regime on their own terms—without creating impartial judicial or legal institutions that could constrain their ability to treat former regime members and supporters as they see fit.

H3: *Post-conflict human rights conditions will remain poor, or be further degraded from pre-conflict levels, when a rebel-led government seizes power from a regime that engaged in extensive targeting of civilians during the war.*

Targeting Civilians during War

Focusing on the long-term consequences of civilian targeting during civil wars raises the question why governments engage in this practice in the first place. The literature suggests two main arguments. First, civilian targeting can be a strategic choice by governments responding to varying constraints from domestic and international audiences ([Stanton 2016](#)). Democratic institutions are a key constraint in this regard; democracies see less civilian targeting by governments ([Eck and Hultman 2007](#)). Second, [Kalyvas (2006)](#) argues that indiscriminate violence, i.e., civilian targeting, is most likely in conflicts with a high imbalance of power between conflict actors during the conflict or in low-information environments. For our study, this implies that the two broad

country-specific attributes (democratic institutions and low-information environments) should be accounted for as well; we address this in the research design immediately below.

Research Design

We analyze human rights conditions after conflicts in each year over a period of up to ten years. To identify conflicts, we use a new dataset, Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC), which captures all cases of violent conflict between an incumbent government and an armed opposition movement within a state between 1945 and 2013 ([Sullivan and Karreth 2019b](#)).[9] Our unit of analysis is the post-conflict year. We create annual observations for a period of ten years after conflict termination for each country that experienced an internal armed conflict. Accounting for a lack of information on some cases and covariates, our analyses cover ninety-six different post-conflict periods between 1960 and 2015.[10]

Outcome Variable

We measure post-conflict HRP using the latent measure created by [Fariss (2014)](#). A challenge to inferring a causal relationship between civilian victimization and the level of post-conflict HRP is the high likelihood that civilian victimization is endogenous; combatants are more likely to target civilians in countries that have poor HRP. We address this issue with two strategies.

First, we estimate regressions in which the outcome is the *change* in HRP from the pre-conflict average to the post-conflict year (cf. [Figure 1](#)), while including a lagged measure of pre-conflict conditions—the average HRP score in a country in the five years prior to conflict onset. This approach allows us to control for all of the observable and unobservable country-level factors responsible for variation in countries' human rights conditions

---

9   The full dataset, codebook, and coding sources are available in [Sullivan and Karreth (2019b)](#). Variables in the dataset were coded by a team of research assistants using over 300 primary and secondary sources. Work on the dataset began with a grant from the Office of Naval Research, US Department of the Navy, and continued with funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The dataset is documented in more detail in [Sullivan and Karreth (2019a)](#).

10   Note that the STAC data cover conflict characteristics. Even though the last conflict coded by STAC ended in 2013, we are able to analyze one post-conflict year beyond 2013 because our analyses focus on HRP after conflicts ended.

at the start of a conflict as well as those factors whose initial values predict civilian victimization in a conflict. We can therefore be more confident about inferring a causal impact on changes in HRP after conflicts from any substantive effects associated with explanatory variables in our empirical model.

Second, we build on the aforementioned literature on civilian targeting and control for the two most prominent predictors of civilian targeting that might also have downstream effects on human rights conditions: democratic institutions before the conflict starts, measuring constraints. More democratic governments are also less likely to deliberately target civilians in internal armed conflicts (Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004). We measure democracy using the binary indicator from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) in the year before the conflict starts to avoid any temporal overlap with intra-war processes. Second, we use population size as a proxy for low-information environments, assuming that larger populations generate at least logistical challenges for governments to gather information on rebel groups and their support structures. For population, we use the natural log of the population measure from Gleditsch (2002).

Method of Analysis

The outcome variable is continuous and approximates a normal distribution. We fit linear multilevel regression models with varying intercepts for each conflict. Because some countries experience multiple conflicts, and we observe multiple post-conflict years for the same country, we report country-clustered standard errors for all analyses below.

Key Explanatory Variables

To test our hypotheses, we build on two variables—government civilian targeting and rebel civilian targeting—from the STAC dataset. These variables indicate whether each actor purposively and repeatedly targeted civilians during the conflict or not.[11] Government or rebel forces are considered to have deliberately engaged in civilian targeting during the armed conflict if they intentionally selected civilians as direct objects of at-

---

11 Coding for the civilian targeting variables in STAC builds on, extends, and cross-validates data on one-sided violence from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP; Eck and Hultman 2007) and Jessica Stanton's data on Forms of Government and Rebel Group Violence against Civilians in Civil Wars, 1989–2010 (Stanton 2016).

tack or consistently failed to discriminate between combatants and noncombatants in their military operations throughout the course of a conflict.[12] We first use a binary indicator of whether *any* actor targeted civilians during war, reflecting the general version of Hypothesis 1. Next, we use binary indicators capturing whether each actor engaged in civilian targeting. The government alone targeted civilians in about 50 percent of conflicts. In about 12 percent, both governments and rebels deliberately targeted civilians. In the remaining 38 percent of cases, neither side deliberately targeted civilians in a consistent manner.

Hypotheses 2 and 3 anticipate that the extent to which intra-war atrocities lead to postwar repression will vary by perpetrator and government composition. To test these hypotheses, we estimate the effect of targeting conditional on government composition: who was in control at the end of the conflict, i.e., the incumbent government (55 percent of the conflicts analyzed in the dataset), a prior rebel group (19 percent of conflicts), a power-sharing arrangement (21 percent of conflicts), or an unclear assertion of authority (5 percent of conflicts), including so-called failed states.

Control Variables

To address potential confounders, we include in our analyses the two aforementioned variables that may predict civilian targeting and are also expected to affect human rights conditions in post-conflict countries: democratic institutions before the conflict starts, measuring prior constraints; and population size as a proxy for low-information environments. Additionally, we expect HRP to improve, even if slowly, the more time has passed after a conflict. We control for the expected trend by including the count of years since the end of a conflict as a predictor.

Several other variables serve as control variables for repression after conflict. Studies have found democracy to be consistently correlated with better human rights practices within a state (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2007) although there are some studies that suggest human rights abuses are more likely during transitions to democracy (Fein 1995; Davenport 2007). We control for the contemporaneous effects of constraints on the executive in countries with more democratic institutions by including a measure of *executive constraints* in the year after the conflict ended. This measure, from the Polity IV dataset,

---

12 Combatants are defined as individuals that engage in armed resistance against regime forces.

is an index that ranges from 1–7 and measures "the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making power of chief executives" (Marshall and Jaggers 2002, 23). Using only the executive constraints measure, rather than the summary index, allows us to avoid potential endogeneity. Scholars have noted that several components of the democracy index implicitly capture HRP (Hill and Jones 2014, 677). Although the level of executive constraints in the year after conflict termination cannot be a confounding variable since it does not precede civilian targeting during the war, controlling for it allows us to parse out the long-term effects of civilian victimization that are independent of formal institutional constraints on the executive that exist at conflict termination.

The intensity of a violent conflict is a potential confounding factor. While we expect a government or rebel strategy of targeting civilians to increase human rights violations in the post-conflict period, it is possible that civilian targeting during a war and human rights violations following the war are both symptoms of a particularly severe conflict. To minimize the influence of highly intense conflicts and avoid bias from casualty reporting, we use a binary indicator for conflicts where government casualties exceeded 10,000 during the course of the entire conflict.[13] Government casualties exceeded this number in approximately 10 percent of conflicts.[14]

We control for differences in levels of economic development across time and across countries by including the natural log of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (in 1995 constant US dollars, from Gleditsch 2002) in each post-conflict year. Lastly, we include a binary variable to indicate that active armed conflict has resumed in a country because we anticipate a decline in HRP scores with conflict recurrence. Additional robustness tests (on slightly smaller samples) control for an increase or decrease in economic grievances as a result of the conflict via the change in GDP per capita compared to pre-conflict levels (based on Gleditsch 2002), as well as a separate measure for conflict outcome (government or rebel victory, or settlement; taken from the STAC data).

Results

In Table 2, two models test whether civilian targeting by any actor (1) or government or rebel forces (2, 3, and 4) has a direct, unconditional effect on changes in

HRP in post-conflict countries compared to HRP levels in the decade before the conflict. In Table 3, we evaluate whether this effect is conditional on who holds power after the conflict ends.

Hypothesis 1: Domestic Security Dilemma

Hypothesis 1 predicts a legacy of violence effect, whereby civilian targeting during an internal armed conflict has an enduring impact on human rights conditions even after a conflict ends. In Table 2, Model 1 shows that post-conflict HRP drop significantly after a conflict when any actor targeted civilians during the conflict. This drop in HRP is at a magnitude of about one-third of a standard deviation of that measure, a sizeable and statistically significant change. Models 2, 3, and 4, show that this difference is entirely due to cases where governments targeted civilians. We see no difference in HRP if rebels alone, or both government and rebel troops, targeted civilians. We conclude that government civilian targeting has a noticeable impact on repression after conflict; rebel civilian targeting or joint targeting itself has no impact beyond poor pre-war human rights conditions and the war itself. Unilateral atrocities committed by governments during war have an enduring effect on human rights, whereas civilian targeting by both sides does not increase repression in addition to potentially high levels of pre-war repression. Importantly, our analyses compare variation in the amount and direction of within-case change in HRP across cases rather than varying levels of HRP across cases. This addresses concerns about endogeneity; we do not simply show that countries with poor HRP experienced civilian targeting and thus showed poor HRP after conflicts. Instead, we find that some countries' HRP record improved while the record of others deteriorated, holding the baseline HRP level constant. Government targeting of civilians is a main driver of this decline in HRP. These results are robust to changing the time windows in which the pre-conflict average HRP score is measured (see the top five rows in Figure 3), and to changing the length of the time period after conflict included in the sample (bottom five rows in Figure 3). The same results also obtain when investigating only aggregate changes in HRP instead of analyzing yearly changes (see Tables A2 and A3 in the supplementary information).

Hypothesis 2: Path Dependence

While Hypothesis 1 suggests that brutal civil wars engender post-conflict societies with poor human rights conditions regardless of who controls the post-conflict government, our next two hypotheses test whether the effects of civilian victimization vary by perpetrator and

---

13   The rebel casualty variable is missing a value in too many cases to make it a useful control in our analyses.

14   Our results are robust to the use of a lower threshold for high-intensity conflict.

Table 2. Multilevel regression estimates of changes in HRP, compared to the HRP average in the five years before conflict

	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
Any side targeted civilians	−0.35*			
	(0.16)			
Government targeted civilians		−0.37*	−0.29*	−0.37*
		(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Both government and rebels targeted civilians		−0.28	−0.28	−0.29
		(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)
>10k government casualties	0.31	0.31	0.36*	0.29
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)
Years after conflict	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
HRP before conflict, five-year average	−0.43*	−0.42*	−0.39*	−0.43*
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Democracy before conflict	−0.12	−0.12	−0.09	−0.13
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)
Population (logged)	−0.08	−0.08	−0.07	−0.07
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Executive constraints	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conflict resumed	−0.25*	−0.25*	−0.24*	−0.25*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.01	−0.01	−0.09	−0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.09)
Change in GDP per capita from pre-conflict period			0.21*	
			(0.13)	
Conflict outcome: compromise				0.04
				(0.23)
Conflict outcome: government victory				−0.01
				(0.21)
Constant	−0.19	−0.21	0.29	−0.24
	(0.66)	(0.69)	(0.77)	(0.68)
Observations	688	688	685	686
Number of conflicts	96	96	94	95

Notes: Unit of analysis: post-conflict period year (up to year 10). Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, one-tailed tests.

government composition. Table 3 reports results from multilevel regressions that include interaction terms to test for the conditional relationships predicted by these two hypotheses. For ease of interpretation, we show in Figure 4 the estimated differences in how a country's HRP score changes in different post-conflict government control scenarios when the civil war government targeted civilians compared to when it was restrained in its treatment of civilians.

If Hypothesis 2 is true, we should observe a decline of HRP when civil war governments that targeted civilians remain in power. We find no evidence to support this hypothesis. Generally, government civilian targeting during conflicts is associated with drops in HRP after conflict, but the only scenario in which government targeting of

civilians during war does *not* lead to a further significant decrease in HRP is if the civil war government remains in power after conflict termination. Here, we find some decrease in HRP, but the data are too noisy to identify a robust effect.

Hypothesis 3: Radicalization and Revenge

In contrast, there is considerable evidence for Hypothesis 3. When the opposition seizes power from a government that victimized civilians during the war, post-conflict HRP scores drop significantly below pre-conflict levels, by about a half-standard deviation of the measure. HRP scores drop even more in a state with unclear governance after the government targeted civilians and under

Table 3. Multilevel regression estimates of changes in HRP, compared to the HRP average in the five years before conflict, conditional on government control after conflict

	(1)
Government targeted civilians	−0.41*
	(0.25)
Government remains in power[1]	−0.04
	(0.27)
Power sharing[1]	0.23
	(0.32)
Unclear government control or failed state[1]	−0.15
	(0.31)
Government targeted civilians and government remains in power[1]	0.20
	(0.33)
Government targeted civilians and power sharing[1]	−0.27
	(0.39)
Government targeted civilians and unclear control/failed state[1]	−0.26
	(0.30)
>10k government casualties	0.35
	(0.22)
Years after conflict	0.05*
	(0.01)
HRP before conflict, five-year average	−0.41*
	(0.09)
Democracy before conflict	−0.10
	(0.19)
Population (logged)	−0.09
	(0.07)
Executive constraints	0.12*
	(0.03)
Conflict resumed	−0.25*
	(0.09)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.02
	(0.09)
Constant	0.03
	(0.78)
Observations	688
Post-conflict periods	96

Notes: Unit of analysis: post-conflict period year (up to year 10). Standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, one-tailed tests.
[1]Baseline comparison: former opposition assumes power.

power-sharing arrangements after the government targeted civilians. That is, if governments that targeted civilians lose their sole grip on power—to their former opponents, a power-sharing arrangement, or to a power vacuum—repression increases. The path from brutal civil war to poor post-conflict outcomes is strongest when the government does not remain in power. This is consistent with arguments about radicalization and revenge in the wake of government-led targeting during armed conflicts. Civilian targeting during war has an enduring effect on human rights conditions.

Discussion

Our results uncover evidence for a lasting legacy of government brutality against civilians during internal armed conflicts. This evidence goes beyond patterns of civilian targeting in states that already repress their population. Instead, we find that HRP decline substantially after civil wars involving civilian targeting by governments, even when governments already had a tainted human rights record before conflicts began.

One theoretical argument led us to anticipate that HRP would be especially likely to deteriorate in countries where abusive governments remain in power, possibly exploiting the opportunity to purge and repress former enemies (Hypothesis 2). We do not find evidence for this pattern. HRP do not decline much further if an abusive government stays in power. Instead, we find evidence for possible patterns of radicalization and revenge. Human rights conditions declined substantially after a previously abusive government lost its sole grip on power, either to a government led by former rebels, a power-sharing agreement, or unclear governance structures. We take this as indication that civilian targeting by governments shifts norms even beyond human rights violations in peacetime.

Many studies show the lasting and considerable negative impact of civil war on a range of political, social, and economic outcomes in post-war societies. Our study emphasizes important sources of variation in these effects, conditional on the treatment of civilians during the conflict. The conduct of belligerents in civil wars shapes human security after war termination in profound and sometimes counterintuitive ways.

Conclusion

In many countries, internal armed conflicts are associated with often dramatic changes in HRP compared to the pre-conflict period (see Figure 1). This study offers one explanation for this variation. We show that governments' treatment of civilians during conflicts can leave a lasting legacy for HRP. Where governments specifically target civilians as part of their counterinsurgency campaign, human rights conditions decline even further after wars end. This is not an artifact of brutal governments abusing civilian populations before, during, and after conflicts. Instead, the damaging legacy of armed conflict for human rights is particularly acute when abusive governments are replaced by the former opposition or enter power-sharing agreements. This finding is consistent with a dynamic of radicalization and revenge on the side of the former opposition. While the lack of more fine-grained data on the identity of human rights violators after conflict

First column: HRP change compared to pre-conflict level averaged over __ years
Second column: Estimates based on observations up to __ years after conflict

Dots are point estimates of the coefficient on gov't targeting civilians, whiskers are 90% confidence intervals.

Figure 3. Overview of robustness tests – estimates for the coefficient on "government targeted civilians" across varying time windows
*Source*: Estimates in Tables A4 and A5 in the supporting information.

Figure 4. Predicted changes in HRP scores in different scenarios.
Source: Estimates from Model (1) in Table 3.

precludes us from asserting more specifically who abuses human rights in our sample of cases, these findings have clear implications for understanding human rights abuses and for international policymakers and human rights advocates.

For research on human rights, our findings suggest that specific norms violations during war (in this case, targeting civilians) have long-lasting ramifications that transcend political parties or groups holding power. While all armed conflict has deleterious consequences for a host of social, political, and economic outcomes, armed conflicts in which governments actively target their own population lead to a substantive drop in HRP. Future research should investigate the channels of how such norms violations translate into abusive behavior by subsequent governments. Although we interpret our findings as evidence for "radicalization and revenge" on the side of the former opposition, it would be important to learn whether subsequent human rights violations are motivated by a general erosion of norms

(radicalization) or a desire for revenge for government atrocities.

For policymakers and human rights advocates, this study highlights once more that governments targeting civilians during internal armed conflicts open Pandora's box of future human rights abuses. This finding does not bode well for recent conflicts such as the civil war in Syria, regardless of how the conflict ends. Even if the Assad government had agreed to partially relinquish power, the damage for human rights norms in Syria was already done. In this sense, our findings yield yet another impetus for the international community to provide stronger deterrents for governments considering targeting civilians as part of their counterinsurgency strategy. While this study does not aim to explain why governments do or do not target civilians in the first place, it suggests that international efforts to prevent such behavior should be motivated not only by a desire to prevent atrocities in the present, but also with an eye toward reducing abuse in the future.

Supplementary Information

Supplementary information is available at the *Journal of Global Security Studies* website. The data and code necessary to reproduce the analyses in this article are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jkarreth.

Acknowledgments

We thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors for their thorough and productive comments on this manuscript. We are grateful to Stephen Gent, Amanda Murdie, Reed Wood, Gary Uzonyi, Alexander Downes, and participants at the 2018 meeting of the Peace Science Society (International) for helpful feedback on earlier versions. Kara Mitchell, Alexander Peeples, and Elvi Sopiqoti contributed valuable research assistance on this project; we also acknowledge the work of the research assistants listed in Sullivan & Karreth (2019a) in producing the STAC data. The authors contributed as follows to this manuscript: JK and PS initiated the project; PS and JK conducted data analysis; GD researched case studies; JK, PS, and GD wrote the manuscript.

References

Amnesty International. 1987. *Report 1987*. London: Amnesty International.

———. 1988. *Report 1988*. London: Amnesty International.

———. 1999. *Report 1999*. London: Amnesty International.

———. 2011. "Uganda Human Rights Violations By the National Resistance Army." https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/uganda-human-rights-violations-by-the-national-resistance-army/.

Anderson, Liam. 2016. "The Perils of Nation-Building in Iraq: The Implications for U.S. Policy in the Middle East." In *Great Powers and Regional Orders: The United States and the Persian Gulf*, edited by Markus Kaim, 183–97. Abingdon: Routledge.

Balcells, Laia. 2010. "Rivalry and Revenge: Violence Against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (2): 291–313.

———. 2017. *Rivalry and Revenge: The Politics of Violence during Civil War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Behrend, Heike. 2000. *Alice Lakwena and the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda, 1967–97*, Chicago, IL: Ohio University Press.

Bell, Andrew M. 2016. "Military Culture and Restraint Toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil Wars." *Security Studies* 25 (3): 488–518.

Bell, Sam R., and Amanda Murdie. 2018. "The Apparatus for Violence: Repression, Violent Protest, and Civil War in a Cross-National Framework." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 35 (4): 336–54.

Blattman, Christopher, Alexandra C. Hartman, and Robert A. Blair. 2014. "How to Promote Order and Property Rights Under Weak Rule of Law? An Experiment in Changing Dispute Resolution Behavior Through Community Education." *American Political Science Review* 108 (1): 100–20.

Bøås, Morten. 2015. *The Politics of Conflict Economies: Miners, Merchants and Warriors in the African Borderland*, London: Routledge.

Boyle, Michael J. 2014. *Violence after War: Explaining Instability in Post-Conflict States*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Branch, Adam. 2011. *Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, and Eric S. Dickson. 2007. "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization." *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (2): 364–81.

Busuttil, James J., Robin L. Dahlberg, Sheldon Oliensis, and Sidney S. Rosdeitcher. 1991. "Uganda at the Crossroads—A Report on Current Human Rights Conditions." *Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York* 46 (6): 598–673.

Carey, Sabine C. 2010. "The Use of Repression As a Response to Domestic Dissent." *Political Studies* 58 (1): 167–86.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143 (1–2): 67–101.

Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 1999. "Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 407–17.

Collier, Paul, V.L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.

Cunningham, David E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2009. "It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53 (4): 570–97.

Davenport, Christian. 1995. "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." *American Journal of Political Science* 39 (3): 683–713.

———. 2000. *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

———. 2007. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Davenport, Christian, and David A. Armstrong, II. 2004. "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (3): 538–54.

Daxecker, Ursula. 2017. "Dirty Hands: Government Torture and Terrorism." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61 (6): 1261–89.

Dodge, Cole P., and Magne Raundalen. 1991. *Reaching Children in War: Sudan, Uganda and Mozambique*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.

Eck, Kristine, and Lisa Hultman. 2007. "One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (2): 233–46.

Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. "Respect for Human Rights Has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability." *American Political Science Review* 108 (2): 297–318.

Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987." *Human Rights Quarterly* 17: 170.

Fortna, Virginia Page, and Reyko Huang. 2012. "Democratization After Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise." *International Studies Quarterly* 56 (4): 801–8.

Gartner, Scott Sigmund, and Patrick M. Regan. 1996. "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (3): 273–87.

Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and Håvard Strand. 2012. "Development Consequences of Armed Conflict." *World Development* 40 (9): 1713–22.

Ghobarah, Hazem Adam, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. 2003. "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People – Long After the Shooting Stops." *American Political Science Review* 97 (2): 189–202.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5): 712–24.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1986. "Tyrants and Terrorists." *Society* 23 (6): 81–4.

Gurses, Mehmet, and T. David Mason. 2008. "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-War Democracy." *Social Science Quarterly* 89 (2): 315–36.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. 2014. "When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?" *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 149–79.

Hardi, Choman. 2011. *Gendered Experiences of Genocide: Anfal Survivors in Kurdistan-Iraq*. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.

Hartzell, Caroline A., and Matthew Hoddie. 2015. "The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Democracy." *World Politics* 67 (1): 37–71.

Henderson, Conway W. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution (1986-1998)* 35 (1): 120–42.

Hill, Daniel W., and Zachary M. Jones. 2014. "An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression." *American Political Science Review* 108 (3): 661–87.

Hoddie, Matthew, and Jason Matthew Smith. 2009. "Forms of Civil War Violence and Their Consequences for Future Public Health." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (1): 175–202.

Höglund, Kristine. 2004. "Violence in the Midst of Peace Negotiations: Cases from Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka." PhD, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Huang, Reyko. 2016. *The Wartime Origins of Democratization: Civil War, Rebel Governance, and Political Regimes*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Human Rights Watch. 1991. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 – Iraq and Occupied Kuwait*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

———. 1992. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 – Iraq and Occupied Kuwait*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

———. 1993. "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds." Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALINT.htm.

———. 1995. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1995 – Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

———. 1997. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1997 – Guatemala*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

———. 2002. *World Report 2002: Events of 2001, November 2000–November 2001*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

———. 2004. "Claims in Conflict-Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq." https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/4.htm.

International Crisis Group. 2012. "Police Reform in Guatemala: Obstacles and Opportunities." https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/police-reform-guatemala-obstacles-and-opportunities

Iqbal, Zaryab. 2010. *War and the Health of Nations*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Jarstad, Anna K. 2009. "Post-Accord Elections and Armed Conflict." In *The Democratization Project: Challenges and Opportunities*, edited by Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer and Joakim Öjendal, 153–63. London: Anthem Press.

Jonas, Susanne. 2000. *Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Joshi, Madhav. 2010. "Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005." *Democratization* 17 (5): 826–55.

Joshi, Madhav, and T. David Mason. 2011. "Civil War Settlements, Size of Governing Coalition, and Durability of Peace in Post-Civil War States." *International Interactions* 37 (4): 388–413.

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, Seonjou, and James Meernik. 2005. "Civil War Destruction and the Prospects for Economic Growth." *Journal of Politics* 67 (1): 88–109.

Kathman, Jacob D., and Reed M. Wood. 2016. "Stopping the Killing During the 'Peace': Peacekeeping and the Severity of Post-Conflict Civilian Victimization." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12 (2): 149–69.

Kaufmann, Chaim. 1996. "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars." *International Security* 20 (4): 136–75.

Keith, Linda Camp. 2002. "Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1977–1996): Are They More Than Mere 'Window Dressing?'" *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (1): 111–43.

Kelly, Michael J. 2008. *Ghosts of Halabja: Saddam Hussein and the Kurdish Genocide*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.

Kim, Hunjoon, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2010. "Explaining the Deterrence Effect of Human Rights Prosecutions for Transitional Countries." *International Studies Quarterly* 54 (4): 939–63.

Klugman, Jeni, Bilin Neyapti, and Frances Stewart. 1999. *Development Centre Studies Conflict and Growth in Africa Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda: Volume 2: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda*. Paris: OECD Publishing.

Kydd, Andrew H., and Barbara F. Walter. 2006. "The Strategies of Terrorism." *International Security* 31 (1): 49–80.

Lai, Brian, and Clayton Thyne. 2007. "The Effect of Civil War on Education, 1980-97." *Journal of Peace Research* 44 (3): 277–92.

Lamwaka, Caroline. 2016. *The Raging Storm: A Reporter's Inside Account of the Northern Uganda War, 1986–2005*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 31 (2): 266–97.

Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV Dataset [Computer file; version p4v2002]. *Center for International Development and Conflict Management*, University of Maryland, MD.

Meernik, James D., Angela Nichols, and Kimi L. King. 2010. "The Impact of International Tribunals and Domestic Trials on Peace and Human Rights After Civil War." *International Studies Perspectives* 11 (4): 309–34.

Minorities at Risk Project. 2004. *Data: Chronology for Sunnis in Iraq*. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, MD.

Mitchell, Neil J., and James M. McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations." *World Politics* 40 (4): 476–98.

Moore, Will H. 2000. "The Repression of Dissent: A Substitution Model of Government Coercion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (1): 107–27.

Nilsson, Marcus. 2012. "Reaping What Was Sown: Conflict Outcome and Post-Civil War Democratization." *Cooperation and Conflict* 47 (3): 350–67.

Ofcansky, Thomas P. 1999. *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Piazza, James A. 2017. "Repression and Terrorism: A Cross-National Empirical Analysis of Types of Repression and Domestic Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 29 (1): 102–18.

Poe, Steven C. 2004. "The Decision to Repress: An Integrative Theoretical Approach to the Research on Human Rights and Repression." In *Understanding Human Rights Violations: New Systematic Studies*, edited by Sabine C. Carey and Steven C. Poe, 16–42. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing.

Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 88 (4): 853–72.

Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda C. Keith. 1999. "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993." *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (2): 291–313.

Posen, Barry R. 1993. "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict." *Survival* 35 (1): 27–47.

Powell, Emilia Justyna, and Jeffrey K. Staton. 2009. "Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation." *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (1): 149–74.

Regan, Patrick M., and Errol A. Henderson. 2002. "Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?" *Third World Quarterly* 23 (1): 119–36.

Renahan, Thomas M. 2017. *The Struggle for Iraq: A View from the Ground Up*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Rohde, Achim. 2010. *State-Society Relations in Ba'thist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship*, Abingdon: Routledge.

Ruhl, J. Mark. 2005. "The Guatemalan Military Since the Peace Accords: The Fate of Reform Under Arzú and Portillo." *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (1): 55–85.

Simons, Geoff. 1994. *Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam*. London: Macmillan.

Spence, Jack. 2005. "Central America and Political Terrorism." In *Democratic Development & Political Terrorism: The Global Perspective*, edited by William J. Crotty, 473–99. Lebanon, NH: Northeastern University Press.

Stanley, William D. 2007. "Multiple Transitions and Interim Governance in El Salvador and Guatemala." In *Interim Governments: Institutional Bridges to Peace and Democracy?*, edited by Karen Guttieri and Jessica Piombo, 123–47. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press.

Stanton, Jessica A. 2016. *Violence and Restraint in Civil War: Civilian Targeting in the Shadow of International Law*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Stern, Jessica. 2000. *The Ultimate Terrorists*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sullivan, Patricia L., and Johannes Karreth. 2019a. "Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict: How Governments and Foreign Interveners Respond to Insurgent Threats." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63 (9): 2207–32.

———. 2019b. "Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC)," https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/HHXDXR, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:n3JAJ7FvgcXmYGBgDWsB6w== [fileUNF].

Tir, Jaroslav, and Johannes Karreth. 2018. *Incentivizing Peace: How International Organizations Can Help Prevent Civil Wars in Member Countries*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Toft, Monica Duffy. 2009. *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2010. "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?" *International Security* 34 (4): 7–36.

UN Historical Clarification Commission. 1999. *Guatemala: Memory of Silence*. Guatemala: UN Historical Clarification Commission.

United States Department of State. 1995. *U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1994 – Iraq*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State.

———. 1997. *U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 – Iraq*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State.

Valentino, Benjamin A. 2004. *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Valentino, Benjamin, Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. 2004. "'Draining the Sea': Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare." *International Organization* 58 (2): 375–407.

Walter, Barbara F. 1997. "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." *International Organization* 51 (3): 335–64.

———. 2002. *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 2015. "Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59 (7): 1242–72.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. "The Paradox of 'Warlord' Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation." *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 17–33.