

Supporting Information for

Civil War Mediation in the Shadow of IGOs: The Path to
Comprehensive Peace Agreements

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All data and code required to reproduce the results in this study are available in a replication package posted at <https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jkarreth>.

This supplementary document contains:

- A A list of all comprehensive peace agreements used in the analyses
- B A list of all IGOs referenced in this study
- C Summary statistics and sources for all variables used in the analyses
- D Full results for all regressions discussed in the manuscript
- E Additional descriptive data discussed in the manuscript
- F An illustration of the sequence of outcomes analyzed in this study

1 Comprehensive peace agreements

Table A1 List of CPAs (used in analyses of H2)

Country	CPA name and date
Angola	Lusaka Protocol, Nov 15 1994
Angola	Luena Memorandum of Understanding, Apr 04 2002
Bangladesh	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord (CHT), Dec 02 1997
Bosnia	General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nov 21 1995
Burundi	Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement / Pretoria Protocol, Nov 02 2003
Cambodia	Framework for a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Oct 23 1991
Congo-Brazzaville	Agreement on Ending Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, Dec 29 1999
Croatia	Erdut Agreement, Nov 12 1995
Djibouti	Accord de paix et de la reconciliation nationale, Dec 26 1994
Djibouti	Agreement for the Reform and Civil Concord, May 12 2001
El Salvador	Chapultepec Peace Agreement, Jan 16 1992
Guatemala	Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace, Dec 29 1996
Guinea-Bissau	Abuja Peace Agreement, Nov 01 1998
India	Memorandum of Settlement (Bodo Accord), Feb 20 1993
Indonesia	MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Aug 15 2005
Ivory Coast	Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), Mar 04 2007
Lebanon	Taif Accord, Oct 22 1989
Liberia	Accra Peace Agreement, Aug 18 2003
Macedonia	Ohrid Agreement, Aug 13 2001
Mali	National Pact, Jan 06 1991
Mozambique	General Peace Agreement for Mozambique, Oct 04 1992
Nepal	Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nov 21 2006
Niger	Agreement Between the Republic Niger Government and the ORA, Apr 15 1995
Papua New Guinea	Bougainville Peace Agreement, Aug 30 2001
Philippines	Mindanao Final Agreement, Sep 02 1996
Rwanda	Arusha Accord – 4 August 1993, Aug 04 1993
Senegal	General Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Senegal and MFDC, Dec 30 2004
Sierra Leone	Abidjan Peace Agreement, Nov 30 1996
Sierra Leone	Lomé Peace Agreement, Jul 07 1999
Sudan	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Jan 09 2005
Tajikistan	General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan, Jun 27 1997
Timor-Leste (East Timor)	Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Portuguese Republic on East Timor, May 05 1999
United Kingdom	Northern Ireland Good Friday Agreement, Apr 10 1998

2 IGOs

Table A2 List of IGOs with high leverage emanating from a combination of (1) economic leverage and (2) institutional prerequisites. Source: Karreth (2018).

IGO	Economic leverage: Issues covered ¹	Institutional prerequisites: tools available ²
African Development Bank	1	5
Asian Development Bank	4	4
Caribbean Community	3	3
Common Southern Market	1	1
Commonwealth Secretariat	1	5
Economic Community of West African States	3	4
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2	5
European Economic Community	2	5
European Investment Bank	2	4
European Union	3	4
World Bank	1	5
International Coffee Organization	4	2
International Fund for Agricultural Development	2	2
International Monetary Fund	1	5
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency	1	4
Southern African Development Community	2	4
West African Economic and Monetary Union	3	4

¹ Numbers: sum of issues covered by the IGO (Trade, Currency, Development, Investment, Production, Resources).

² Numbers: features available to the IGO (Financial authority, Decision-making, Bureaucracy, Independence, Use of carrots & sticks).

3 Detailed information on variables

Table A3 Summary of control variables

Concept	Variable	Description	Source	Scale
Conflict characteristics	Battle deaths	Soldiers and civilians killed in combat	Lacina and Gleditsch (2005)	Logged
	Conflict duration in years	Time between start and end of the conflict	Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015)	Logged
	Conflict over territory	Binary indicator set to 1 if incompatibility is over territory	Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015)	Binary
Country characteristics	Oil, diamonds or drugs present	Binary indicator set to 1 for countries where revenue is available from extracting oil, drugs, gemstones	Lujala (2010)	Binary
	Population size	Number of residents in the country at midyear	Gleditsch (2002); World Bank (2010)	Logged
	Democratic political institutions (VDem Polyarchy index)	Electoral democracy index based on expert surveys: weighted average of freedom of association, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage	Lührmann, Dahlum, Lindberg, Maxwell, Mechkova, Olin, Pillai, Petrarca, Sigman, and Stepanova (2018)	Standardized
Economic factors	GDP per capita	Real GDP p.c. in 2005 US\$	Gleditsch (2002); World Bank (2010)	Logged
	Trade globalization	Index combining the sum of exports and imports of goods as a share of GDP, the sum of exports and imports of services as a share of GDP, and trade partner diversification in goods trade.	Gygli, Haelg, and Sturm (2018)	Standardized
External involvement	UNPKO mission present	Binary indicator set to 1 if UN peacekeeping operation present	International Peace Institute (2016)	Binary
	External intervention by major power	Binary indicator set to 1 if major power is intervening in the conflict	Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand (2002); Allansson, Melander, and Themnér (2017)	Binary
Alignment with United States	π (squared distances, valued UN voting data)	Chance-corrected measure of UN voting distance to the United States	Haeghe (2011)	Standardized

Table A4 Summary statistics for analyses of mediation at the conflict-year; all observations.

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N
Mediation in given year	0.34	0.48	0	0.00	1	934
Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage	4.85	1.55	0	5.00	10	934
Memberships in other HSIPOs	11.31	2.78	0	11.00	20	934
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	4.41	2.62	0.00	4.73	9.85	927
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.87	0.95	0.00	0.69	3.18	934
Conflict duration (years logged)	2.50	0.91	0.69	2.64	4.16	934
Territorial conflict	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	934
Natural resources	0.90	0.31	0	1.00	1	925
Population in prior year (logged)	17.38	1.73	12.87	17.31	21.00	910
Democracy in prior year	-0.39	0.88	-1.68	-0.50	1.50	882
GDP per capita in prior year (logged)	7.49	1.15	4.73	7.41	10.75	908
Trade globalization	-0.01	1.00	-2.05	-0.12	2.79	895
UNPKO	0.17	0.37	0	0.00	1	934
UNGA proximity to US	0.00	1.00	-1.10	-0.35	4.01	927
Time to mediation	3.91	4.42	1.00	2.00	23.00	934

Table A5 Summary statistics for analyses of mediation at the conflict-year; estimation sample only.

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N
Mediation in given year	0.32	0.47	0	0.00	1	841
Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage	4.97	1.51	1	5.00	10	841
Memberships in other HSIPOs	11.55	2.68	4	11.00	20	841
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	4.32	2.51	0.00	4.62	9.40	841
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.83	0.94	0.00	0.69	3.18	841
Conflict duration (years logged)	2.53	0.91	0.69	2.71	4.16	841
Territorial conflict	0.47	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	841
Natural resources	0.92	0.28	0	1.00	1	841
Population in prior year (logged)	17.47	1.74	13.29	17.49	21.00	841
Democracy in prior year	-0.37	0.88	-1.68	-0.47	1.50	841
GDP per capita in prior year (logged)	7.54	1.14	4.93	7.45	10.75	841
Trade globalization	0.04	1.00	-2.05	-0.09	2.79	841
UNPKO	0.17	0.38	0	0.00	1	841
UNGA proximity to US	0.02	1.02	-1.10	-0.34	4.01	841
Time to mediation	4.17	4.57	1.00	2.00	23.00	841

Table A6 Summary statistics for analyses of mediation at the conflict; all observations.

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N
Total mediation years	2.09	3.36	0	0.00	17	178
Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, before conflict	4.16	1.78	0	4.00	9	178
Memberships in other HSIGOs	10.34	3.08	1	10.00	18	178
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	33.05	36.29	0.00	19.67	179.25	178
Conflict duration (years logged)	2.02	1.01	0.69	1.95	4.11	178
Territorial conflict	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.50	1.00	178
Natural resources	0.85	0.36	0	1.00	1	174
Population before conflict (logged)	16.98	1.73	12.87	16.92	21.00	176
Democracy before conflict	-0.72	0.85	-1.68	-1.05	1.40	156
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	7.27	1.06	4.73	7.22	10.10	174
Trade globalization before conflict	0.01	1.06	-2.05	-0.13	2.70	170
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	-0.07	0.74	-0.97	-0.34	3.34	176

Table A7 Summary statistics for analyses of mediation at the conflict; estimation sample only.

	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N
Total mediation years	1.91	3.23	0	0.00	17	145
Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, before conflict	4.46	1.57	2	4.00	9	145
Memberships in other HSIGOs	10.79	2.48	6	10.00	18	145
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	32.33	32.73	0.00	20.46	127.63	145
Conflict duration (years logged)	2.09	1.01	0.69	2.20	4.11	145
Territorial conflict	0.46	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	145
Natural resources	0.85	0.36	0	1.00	1	145
Population before conflict (logged)	17.15	1.74	13.29	17.49	21.00	145
Democracy before conflict	−0.72	0.87	−1.68	−1.13	1.40	145
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	7.34	1.01	5.47	7.23	10.10	145
Trade globalization before conflict	0.05	1.05	−2.05	−0.10	2.70	145
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	−0.11	0.70	−0.97	−0.34	3.34	145

4 Full estimation results

Overview of all estimation results presented in this manuscript:

1. Analyses of Hypothesis 1

(a) At the conflict-year level of analysis

- Base model: Table [A8](#)
- Base model with multiply imputed data to address missing data: Table [A9](#)

(b) At the conflict level of analysis

- Base model: Table [A10](#)
- Base model with multiply imputed data to address missing data: Table [A11](#)
- Count outcome log-transformed for OLS estimator: [A12](#)
- Instrumental variable estimates to account for endogenous IGOs, building on base model with count outcome log-transformed for OLS estimator: Table [A13](#), and first-stage estimates in Table [A14](#)
- Influence of model specification on estimates: Figure [A1](#)

2. Analyses of Hypothesis 2

- Base model: Table [A15](#) and Figure [A2](#)
- Base model with multiply imputed data to address missing data: Table [A16](#) and Figure [A3](#)

3. Analysis linking Hypotheses 1 and 2

- Bivariate probit estimates: Table [A17](#) and Figure [A4](#)

Table A8 Evidence on H1: Probit estimates of mediation incidents, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict-year.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage	0.134* (0.050)
All other HSI­GOs	0.036 (0.031)
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	0.046 (0.029)
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.405* (0.104)
Conflict duration (years logged)	–0.070 (0.085)
Territorial conflict	–0.324 (0.175)
Population (logged)	–0.222* (0.100)
Democracy	–0.050 (0.115)
GDP per capita (logged)	–0.255* (0.084)
Trade globalization	0.050 (0.063)
UNPKO	–0.017 (0.205)
UNGA proximity to US	0.244* (0.067)
Time to event	–0.576* (0.137)
Time to event (squared)	0.048* (0.019)
Time to event (cubed)	–0.001 (0.001)
Log Likelihood	–318.502
Observations	841

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

Table A9 Evidence on H1, using IGOs with high economic leverage: Probit estimates of mediation incidents, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict-year. Estimates after multiple imputation.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage	0.12* (0.04)
Other HSIGOs	0.01 (0.03)
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	0.04 (0.02)
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.43* (0.09)
Conflict duration (years logged)	−0.07 (0.09)
Territorial conflict	−0.25* (0.12)
Natural resources	0.14 (0.18)
Population (logged)	−0.22* (0.05)
Democracy	−0.07 (0.10)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.22* (0.07)
Trade globalization	−0.02 (0.07)
UNPKO	0.02 (0.15)
UNGA proximity to US	0.26* (0.07)
Time to event	−0.61* (0.10)
Time to event squared	0.05* (0.01)
Time to event cubed	−0.00* (0.00)
Intercept	4.90* (0.96)
Log Likelihood	−373.28
Observations	941

$p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A10 Evidence on H1: Negative binomial estimates of mediation incidents, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict	0.678* (0.129)
All other HSIPOs before conflict	0.027 (0.090)
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	0.005 (0.005)
Conflict duration (years logged)	1.118* (0.193)
Territorial conflict	0.169 (0.369)
Natural resources	0.081 (0.407)
Population before conflict (logged)	−0.511* (0.124)
Democracy before conflict	−0.457 (0.248)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	0.094 (0.231)
Trade globalization before conflict	0.028 (0.157)
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	0.261 (0.139)
Intercept	1.740 (4.007)
Log Likelihood	−211.030
Observations	145

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

Table A11 Evidence on H1: Negative binomial estimates of total mediation years, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict. Estimates after multiple imputation

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict	0.458* (0.083)
All other HSIGOs before conflict	–0.078 (0.055)
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	0.007* (0.003)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.965* (0.150)
Territorial conflict	0.395* (0.219)
Natural resources	0.012 (0.329)
Population before conflict (logged)	–0.496* (0.094)
Democracy before conflict	–0.428* (0.179)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	0.148 (0.112)
Trade globalization before conflict	–0.015 (0.128)
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	0.369* (0.158)
Intercept	3.640* (1.808)
Log Likelihood	–297.710
Observations	185

$p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A12 Evidence on H1: OLS estimates of (logged) mediation incidents, 1989–2011.
Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict	0.314* (0.057)
All other HSIGOs before conflict	0.022 (0.043)
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	0.004 (0.002)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.355* (0.107)
Territorial conflict	0.066 (0.176)
Natural resources	0.115 (0.143)
Population before conflict (logged)	−0.217* (0.047)
Democracy before conflict	−0.296* (0.109)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	0.022 (0.091)
Trade globalization before conflict	0.018 (0.069)
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	0.196* (0.081)
Intercept	1.407 (1.335)
R2	0.479
Observations	145

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

Table A13 Evidence on H1: Instrumental variable estimates of total mediation years (logged), 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict	0.314* (0.057)
All other HSIGOs before conflict	0.022 (0.043)
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	0.004 (0.002)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.355* (0.107)
Territorial conflict	0.066 (0.176)
Natural resources	0.115 (0.143)
Population before conflict (logged)	−0.217* (0.047)
Democracy before conflict	−0.296* (0.109)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	0.022 (0.091)
Trade globalization before conflict	0.018 (0.069)
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	0.196* (0.081)
Intercept	1.407 (1.335)
R2	0.479
Observations	145

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$

Table A14 First stage estimates of instrumental variable results from Table A13. Outcome variable: Memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict. Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Model 1
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	0.003 (0.004)
Conflict duration (years logged)	−0.059 (0.163)
Territorial conflict	0.222 (0.234)
Natural resources	0.668 (0.393)
Population before conflict (logged)	0.298* (0.103)
Democracy before conflict	0.592* (0.210)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	0.138 (0.164)
Trade globalization before conflict	−0.047 (0.158)
UNGA proximity to US before conflict	−0.203 (0.174)
Instrument for IGOs with high economic leverage before conflict	1.176* (0.134)
Intercept	−7.161* (3.167)
R2	0.703
Observations	145

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$




Figure A1 Posterior probabilities of coefficients, based on Bayesian Model Averaging for analyses of mediation (H1). For each explanatory variable, the density curves show the posterior probability of the relationship between that variable and the probability of mediation. Curves peaking to the left of 0 indicate a negative, and curves peaking to the right of 0 a positive relationship. The height of the vertical black line shows the posterior probability of *no* relationship between the respective variable and conflict escalation.

Table A15 Evidence on H2, using IGOs with high economic leverage: Probit estimates of CPA signings, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage	–0.065 (0.093)
Battle deaths throughout conflict (logged)	–0.003 (0.004)
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.172 (0.767)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.151 (0.223)
Territorial conflict	–0.182 (0.284)
Excluded population	–0.159 (0.240)
Population before conflict (logged)	–0.246 (0.172)
Democracy before conflict	0.402 (0.229)
GDP per capita before conflict (logged)	–0.229 (0.208)
UNPKO	0.036 (0.258)
IGOs x Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.091 (0.098)
Log Likelihood	–60.980
Observations	168

Standard errors, clustered by region, in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$




Figure A2 IGOs with high economic leverage, prior mediation, and estimated probability of CPA signing in a typical conflict. Reflecting H2 (suggesting that the effect of IGOs on CPA signing is higher when a country is a member to more IGOs), each panel shows the relationship between mediation and the probability of CPA signing at a different level of IGO memberships. Dots and whiskers represent point estimates and confidence intervals, respectively; estimates are shown in Table A15. All other covariates are set to median values. $N = 168$ conflicts. This figure is reproduced from Figure ?? in the main text.

Table A16 Evidence on H2, using IGOs with high economic leverage: Probit estimates of CPA signings, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict. Estimates after multiple imputation.

	Model 1
IGOs with high economic leverage	–0.00 (0.15)
Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.37 (0.51)
IGOs x Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.06 (0.10)
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	–0.00 (0.00)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.09 (0.22)
Territorial conflict	–0.36 (0.29)
Natural resources	–0.30 (0.38)
Excluded population	–0.09 (0.15)
Population (logged)	–0.17 (0.12)
Democracy	0.31 (0.22)
GDP per capita (logged)	–0.12 (0.15)
UNPKO	0.04 (0.33)
Intercept	2.59 (2.39)
Log Likelihood	–64.79
Observations	185

* $p < 0.05$




Figure A3 IGOs with high economic leverage, prior mediation, and estimated probability of CPA signing in a typical conflict – based on imputed data. Dots and whiskers represent point estimates and confidence intervals, respectively. All other covariates are set to median values. $N = 185$ conflicts after multiple imputation.

Table A17 Evidence on H2: Bivariate probit estimates of CPA signings, 1989–2011. Unit of analysis: conflict.

	Estimate	Std. Error
Equation 1: did the conflict experience mediation?		
IGOs with high economic leverage	0.69*	(0.13)
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	0.01	(0.00)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.62*	(0.19)
Territorial conflict	0.42	(0.30)
Natural resources	−0.17	(0.45)
Population (logged)	−0.53*	(0.12)
Democracy	−0.58*	(0.21)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.03	(0.14)
Trade globalization	−0.09	(0.15)
UNGA proximity to US	0.57*	(0.20)
Intercept	3.76	(2.44)
Equation 2: was a CPA signed?		
IGOs with high economic leverage	−0.06	(0.19)
Prior years with mediation (logged)	−0.05	(0.60)
Battle deaths in prior year (logged)	0.003	(0.00)
Conflict duration (years logged)	0.19	(0.26)
Territorial conflict	0.15	(0.39)
Natural resources	−0.27	(0.44)
Excluded population	−0.25	(0.16)
Population (logged)	−0.38*	(0.13)
Democracy	0.41	(0.25)
GDP per capita (logged)	−0.21	(0.17)
UNPKO	0.24	(0.37)
IGOs × Prior years with mediation (logged)	0.10	(0.11)
Intercept	6.90*	(3.02)
Observations	145	

$p < 0.05$. Standard errors in parentheses.




Figure A4 IGOs with high economic leverage, prior mediation, and estimated probability of CPA signing in a typical conflict. Results based on bivariate probit specification (Table A17). Dots and whiskers represent point estimates and confidence intervals, respectively. All other covariates are set to median values. $N = 145$ conflicts.

5 Additional descriptive data




Figure A5 Distribution of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, distinguishing by whether countries experience domestic armed conflicts in a given year or not.




Figure A6 Average number of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage in countries with armed conflicts and those without, 1989-2011.




Figure A7 Conflict years, mediation, and CPA signings over time.




Figure A8 Conflict years, mediation, and CPA signings over time — split up by continent.




Figure A9 Bivariate correlation coefficients between membership count in IGOs with high economic leverage and other covariates. All variables were standardized before calculating correlations.

Table A18 List of countries with conflicts in the data and their IGO membership counts before conflict.

Country	Year	IGO memberships
Iran	1990	3
Iran	1993	3
Iran	1996	3
Philippines	1995	4
Philippines	1997	4
Paraguay	1989	4
Myanmar (Burma)	1992	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1995	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1998	2
Myanmar (Burma)	2011	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1992	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1994	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1991	3
Myanmar (Burma)	1994	3
Myanmar (Burma)	1990	2
Myanmar (Burma)	1996	2
India	1994	6
Myanmar (Burma)	1992	2
Guatemala	1996	4
India	2000	6
Myanmar (Burma)	1992	3
Myanmar (Burma)	1996	3
Myanmar (Burma)	2005	3
Iraq	1996	3
Lebanon	1989	3
Laos	1990	3
Myanmar (Burma)	2002	3
Myanmar (Burma)	2011	3
Nepal	2006	3
Iraq	1992	3
Iraq	1996	3
Venezuela	1992	4
Congo - Kinshasa	2001	6
Congo - Kinshasa	2008	6
Burundi	2000	5
Chad	1994	4
Chad	2003	4
Chad	2010	4
Peru	1999	4
Peru	2010	4

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Table A18 – continued from previous page

Country	Year	IGO memberships
Nigeria	2009	8
Cambodia	1991	2
Guinea	2001	7
Philippines	1996	4
Uganda	1992	6
Uganda	2011	6
United Kingdom	1998	9
El Salvador	1991	4
Bangladesh	1997	4
Pakistan	2004	5
Pakistan	2009	5
Eritrea	1997	3
Eritrea	1999	3
Eritrea	2003	3
Angola	1994	3
Angola	2002	3
Indonesia	1992	5
Indonesia	1999	5
Morocco	1989	5
Morocco	1990	5
Mozambique	1992	4
India	1992	6
India	1997	6
India	2004	6
Nicaragua	1990	4
Iran	1991	3
Iran	1993	3
Iran	1997	3
Iran	2001	3
Iran	2011	3
Liberia	2003	6
Spain	1991	9
India	1996	6
India	2000	6
India	2009	6
India	1993	6
Ethiopia	1996	6
India	1990	6
India	2010	6
Indonesia	2005	5
Panama	1989	3
Papua New Guinea	2001	5

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Table A18 – continued from previous page

Country	Year	IGO memberships
Mali	1991	5
Niger	1995	5
Rwanda	1993	5
Senegal	2004	6
Trinidad & Tobago	1990	6
Djibouti	1994	3
Djibouti	2001	3
Haiti	1989	4
Haiti	1991	4
Haiti	2004	4
Sierra Leone	1996	7
Sierra Leone	1999	7
Turkey	1992	5
Turkey	2005	5
Angola	1991	5
Angola	1994	5
Angola	1998	5
Angola	2002	5
Angola	2004	5
Angola	2007	5
Angola	2009	5
Egypt	1998	6
Azerbaijan	1993	3
Azerbaijan	1995	3
Russia	1993	3
Mexico	1994	5
Mexico	1996	5
Russia	1996	3
Russia	2007	3
Pakistan	1990	5
Pakistan	1996	5
Niger	1995	6
Congo - Brazzaville	1999	5
Guinea-Bissau	1998	6
Lesotho	1998	7
Russia	1999	4
Uzbekistan	2000	4
Uzbekistan	2004	4
Central African Republic	2002	4
Central African Republic	2006	4
North Macedonia	2001	4
Ivory Coast	2007	8

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Table A18 – continued from previous page

Country	Year	IGO memberships
India	1993	6
Myanmar (Burma)	1997	3
Nigeria	2004	8
Nigeria	2004	8
Israel	1999	3
Israel	2006	3
Congo - Kinshasa	2008	6
Congo - Kinshasa	2009	6
Niger	1992	5
Niger	1997	5
Niger	2008	5
India	2008	7
India	1997	6
Myanmar (Burma)	2009	3
Mauritania	2011	5
Libya	2011	5
China	2008	5
Mali	2009	7
Myanmar (Burma)	1995	3
Myanmar (Burma)	2001	3
Myanmar (Burma)	2007	3




Figure A10 Ivory Coast, compared to all other cases in the data along key variables. Histograms show the distribution of all cases (except Ivory Coast), and dark dots show the value of Ivory Coast on the respective variable. For display purposes, continuous variables are standardized (centered around 0 and divided by one standard deviation).

6 Sequence of outcomes analyzed in this study




Figure A11 Distribution of outcomes of interest.

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