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International Third Parties and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements After Civil War

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Abstract: Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars, but their implementation varies across post-conflict countries and over time. To explain varying implementation, this study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that international third parties are uniquely positioned to overcome them. (1) IGOs with high economic leverage, and (2) prior foreign aid both set incentives that reduce domestic barriers to implementation. Quantitative evidence on the implementation of CPAs from 1989-2015 supports this argument. Both post-conflict countries' participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and higher volumes of prior foreign aid are associated with higher rates of CPA implementation. Multiple estimation approaches, including instrumental variables, support this finding. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast tracks the processes by which IGOs and donors help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.

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Author contributions

JK and JT conceptualized the study; MJ and JQ collected CPA implementation data; JK compiled all other quantitative data and conducted data analysis; JK, JQ, and JT conducted case research; JK, MJ, JQ, and JT wrote the article.

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Replication data

All data and code required to reproduce the results in this study, as well as the supporting information (SI), are available in a replication package posted at `http://www.jkarreth.net` and `https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jkarreth`.

When implemented, comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars. To explain why CPA implementation varies between and within countries (Figure 1), this study argues that international third parties can mitigate key challenges to implementation by providing credible prospects of resources to post-conflict countries. With civil wars only deepening economic fragility (Gates, Hegre, Nygård, and Strand 2012), states relying on comprehensive peace agreements to move beyond violent conflict face serious resource constraints in implementing peace. Lack of resources can drive stakeholder resistance to implementation. Two types of third-party influence can address these challenges to implementation. IGOs with high economic leverage from institutional structures, notable economic resources, and permanent ties to member states (such as the World Bank, IMF, regional development banks; see Table A2) help incentivize stakeholders to implement CPA stipulations. Second, foreign aid can establish credible incentives toward CPA implementation when prior aid delivery sets a baseline for expectations about future aid.

Timely implementation of CPAs has wide-ranging consequences for a variety of political, social, and economic outcomes within a post-conflict country and its region. Successful implementation facilitates recovery and political stability. It even affects negotiations between governments and armed groups outside of the CPA. At a time when the United Nations and other international actors place more emphasis than ever on supporting peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery processes (Hauenstein and Joshi 2020), understanding how CPAs can be implemented successfully is key for policymakers and scholars.

We outline how CPAs compare to other peace agreement types, note common challenges to implementation, and show that credible international third-party material resources are uniquely positioned to persuade reluctant domestic stakeholders to follow through on CPA obligations. Empirical analyses of CPA implementation from 1989–2015 support this argument, followed by case evidence from implementing Ivory Coast's Ouagadougou Political Agreement after 2007 and a brief discussion of obstacles to implementation in Rwanda after 1993.

The importance of CPAs

Ceasefire, partial peace, and implementation agreements can all be used to attempt to stop civil wars (Kreutz 2010). But we focus on CPAs for three key reasons. First, the issues underlying civil wars are highly complex, necessitating effective peace agreements to be multidimensional. CPAs outline the multifaceted policy reforms to be implemented in the post-conflict years, such as the resolution of grievances, power and resource sharing, autonomy, disarmament, security sector reform, and other issues. Second, the benefits of CPAs are well documented, including the lowest rate of conflict recurrence (Joshi and Quinn 2016), longer periods of peace (Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015), and more peaceful elections (Joshi, Melander, and Quinn 2017). Third, the most effective civil war agreements leave out few or no policy domains (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008) and implementation on a broader range of issues reduces the probability of future opposition groups (that were not part of a previous, partial peace agreement) challenging the government (Joshi and Quinn 2016). Aduda (2019) also shows that failed partial peace agreements lead to less subsequent involvement by external mediators. Meanwhile, CPA implementation produces country-level effects on opposition group behavior beyond those groups that negotiated the agreement, amplifying the positive impact of implementation for post-conflict stability and development.

We focus on variation in the *overall* level to which a CPA is implemented, rather than narrowly on one or more agreement components. This is important because agreement provisions are intended to work together in an integrative fashion toward a larger goal of enduring peace and stability. Our approach matches a global trend towards negotiating comprehensive agreements that incorporate short-term goals such as ending hostilities and demobilization, alongside a larger agenda of attempting to reform structural and historical sources of grievances that fueled the conflict. Arguments by Bell (2006), Fazal (2013), and many others suggest that changes in international norms of accountability, laws, and the increased attention to civil conflict have created an atmosphere where negotiating and implementing a peace agreement reflects a much higher level of commitment than in the past. Attempts to end a civil war through an extensive, long-term process of implementing a comprehensive set of reforms are a relatively new development in world politics requiring in-depth analysis.

Challenges to CPA implementation

Figure 1 shows that CPA implementation varies considerably. Despite initially agreeing on stipulations, stakeholders can be unable or unwilling to complete concrete steps required by the CPA. Implementation compliance will arguably be greater if the relevant stakeholders have the needed resources and believe that the CPA will succeed and advance their interests. Stakeholders actively need to change policies and commit resources to these changes. A lack of resources, however, may mean that stakeholders are *unable* to implement policies. For instance, a lack of supporting funds will stifle efforts to demobilize and reintegrate former fighters. Institutional reform also requires resources.

Unwillingness to implement despite signing a CPA, meanwhile, can be traced back to a credible commitment problem. Per Walter (1997, 339), once rebels demobilize and disarm, they have lost a major bargaining chip in making sure that agreed-upon social, political, and economic reforms are actually implemented. Status quo-satisfied stakeholders working within the policy jurisdictions affected by a CPA will have strong incentives to resist efforts to reform the status quo. Anticipating this and seeing real or perceived signals of non-implementation, or a lack of resources and the resulting inability to implement, may lead the rebel side to shirk as well. In the first year of the peace process in El Salvador, for example, the government did not meet established deadlines. In response, the FMLN, which had been demobilizing on schedule, refused to complete the process until progress in implementation was observed. After the signing of the General Agreement between the Tajik Government and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in 1997, the UTO rank and file abstained from the DDR process. They stated that they would begin to demobilize when they saw government action on the implementation of the peace agreement, with a particular emphasis on political reforms, joint dispute resolution, and the release of UTO war prisoners. There is also evidence that support for peace processes is tied to political preferences (Liendo and Braithwaite 2018). In sum, post-civil war settings are rife with conditions complicating CPA implementation.

Third parties and implementation

International third parties can address some of the pressure against CPA implementation by, for example, naming and shaming those resisting implementation via UN Security Council resolutions (Hauenstein and Joshi 2020). But unwillingness and inability to implement are not fully resolved even by a strong third party willing to back the agreement in some general diplomatic sense or willing to step in and provide stability and security in the early stages of implementation (e.g., through peacekeeping). Attention from third parties may also decline over time, hindering implementation (Matanock 2020). Third parties may also lack the on-the-ground presence necessary to reassure local-level stakeholders that implementation does not expose them to blowback from their constituents or to violence from their (former) opponents.

Common third-party enforcement devices, such as UN peacekeeping, play a verification role as an information provider as well as physical protection. This can help end conflicts, but generally fails to force the many stakeholders to implement policies within different agencies or bureaucracies. As Beber, Gilligan, Guardado, and Karim (2019) and others suggest, the positive impact of peacekeepers on political contestation and broader economic recovery can evaporate once missions leave. Peacekeeping missions usually last until the first elections are held, as such elections provide convenient exit strategies for international actors (Kumar 1998). Finally, per the data used in this study, the deployment of UN peacekeepers is required by fewer than one-third of the CPA cases we analyze.

The effectiveness of other third-party strategies is also limited. While third-party verification, for example, can assess whether implementation is taking place or not, it lacks enforcement power. In South Sudan, the verification mechanism is currently fulfilling its reporting mandate, but implementation remains stalled. Finally, sponsoring negotiations does not automatically translate into strong implementation support if the interest in actual implementation wanes.

International organizations, foreign aid, and implementation

Effective third-party CPA implementation support needs to address unwillingness and inability among implementing agents, and with it the commitment problems that can cause both (Matanock 2020). To do so, third parties need institutionalized channels of influence and the ability to affect bureaucratic behavior and compliance at the level crucial to implementation. As Campbell (2018) shows, international third parties often fail to achieve their goals in peacekeeping operations precisely when they lack such connections and accountability to local stakeholders. Importantly, the third party must also have a strong intrinsic self-interest in promoting CPA implementation.

We argue, first, that intergovernmental organizations with high economic leverage and institutionalized structures (Karreth 2018; Tir and Karreth 2018) can credibly reshape the incentives of implementing agents. Second, tangible ties between post-conflict state and international third parties in the form of prior foreign aid can address implementation obstacles. In each case, deeper and more expansive connections (i.e., more IGOs memberships and higher prior aid volume) indicate stronger influence of third parties on overcoming implementation problems. International ties, whether through existing memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage or prior foreign aid, set expectations about future economic benefits if implementation proceeds successfully. And existing memberships and prior aid mean that credible channels exist for both initial and continued support toward implementation.

Both types of third-party influence affect the behavior of those responsible for CPA implementation. First, both IGOs with high economic leverage and foreign aid donors command material resources that can resolve material inability to implement reforms. Second, both imply that third parties have a demonstrated interest in that country. Unlike verbal appeals or ad-hoc support for implementation, this vested interest in implementation can supplant implementation efforts in the longer term and mitigate commitment problems. Third, both types of influence suggest that domestic governmental actors at different levels have benefited from receiving these additional resources and therefore seek their continuation. Fourth, external support in the form of future foreign aid (conditional on peace and stability) is more credible when ties are durable (in the case of IGO memberships) or there is established precedent. Fifth, the receipt of future resources from both of these sources is *conditional* on domestic actors meeting their obligations. Implementing the terms of CPAs falls under this scope, as third parties would be highly reluctant to invest their resources under continued instability and threat of conflict resumption. Finally, these third-party incentives also extend to potential spoiler groups that might try to undermine implementation. Prior work shows that even rebel groups outside peace processes stop fighting as CPA implementation reaches higher levels (Joshi and Quinn 2016). Therefore, implementation success (through mitigating obstacles early on via incentives) can lead to even incentive-resistant spoilers abandoning plans to pick up arms and block implementation at a later point.

IGOs with high economic leverage

IGOs with high economic leverage and institutionalized structures are a small subset of international organizations. They possess both considerable economic resources and institutionalized power over member states. Table A2 and Karreth (2018) provide more details on this definition. Examples of IGOs with high economic leverage include the World Bank, the IMF, or regional development banks. Compared to other IGOs or non-IGO third parties, these IGOs are uniquely positioned to support overcoming hurdles to implementation. IGOs with high economic leverage provide material resources to member countries. Such support often comes in long-term arrangements with comparatively clear guidelines, especially in comparison to support from bilateral donors negotiated on an ad-hoc basis. Whether or not directly related to CPA implementation, IGO-based funds can have palpable and constructive indirect effects. They can strengthen government capacity to implement and monitor reforms. IGOs' support can also reduce local grievances that might otherwise sabotage CPAs.

The organizations' relative independence from member governments and their command of substantial tangible resources also allow them to mitigate the unwillingness of pro-status quo stakeholders affiliated with the government. Even if they are not directly involved in negotiating an agreement, IGOs with high economic leverage have a strong interest in seeing their investment in member countries succeed. Their primary goal is to pursue existing policy interventions and projects successfully, and potentially expand their activities. Such success is contingent on stability and, if a CPA was signed, its successful implementation. Many IGOs with regional or global scope have therefore actively voiced preferences for CPA implementation and set up tools to support implementation, such as multi-donor trust funds. Failing to implement obligations from a signed agreement in turn would be costly to a government connected to IGOs because current and future IGO-based benefits would be lost. This puts notable pressure on government stakeholders to compromise amongst themselves to secure future IGO-based benefits. Few other third-party actors have this kind of influence. Power-grabbing attempts by stakeholders that may stand to lose from a CPA to protect their positions would be counterproductive even if they seem tempting. If a portion of the CPA were to be blocked, IGO sanctions or limits on their engagement would likely follow. This makes it unlikely that power-grabbing stakeholders would be notably better off. In contrast, a government with few prior connections to IGOs with high economic leverage has much less to lose if it fails to coerce implementing actors to follow through on agreed-upon reforms.

The promise of future IGO-related resources can go a long way to assuage the fears of those potentially on the losing end of CPA-related reforms. Increased resources can placate or even buy off the potential losers from trying to sabotage the CPA. IGOs with high economic leverage also have durable institutional structures and a lasting presence in member states. They typically do not leave, disengage, or pull out employees and resources due to a change in political leadership or changes in public opinion. Thus, such IGOs are arguably better suited than third-party states, or other actors depending on political interest, at guaranteeing resources that overcome stakeholders' fear that former opponents will stop implementing as soon as third-party pressure wanes. And since IGO-related benefits can be expected to be long-term if not permanent, they carry high expected value. Despite some parties losing influence with CPA-related status quo reforms, this opens opportunities to reach internal agreements to attenuate potential losses to various pro-status quo stakeholders.

IGOs with high economic leverage further impact the kind of domestic policy jurisdictions that are commonly the targets of reform in CPA implementation processes (e.g., development, health, education, reconstruction, cultural protection, agriculture, finance, trade). Such IGOs can thus incentivize implementation in specific jurisdictions, enabling greater levels of implementation.

Opposition and former rebel movements, too, are subject to the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage. If former rebels continue to control or dominate sections of the country after the CPA is signed, they will benefit from resources provided by IGOs. If they make resources conditional on cooperating in implementing the CPA, IGOs can serve to overcome resistance among these non-governmental stakeholders as well. Prior research shows that non-state actors and explicitly rebel and dissident groups are receptive to such signals and, more broadly, can respect rules and conditions from international sources even though they lack direct, formal ties to international institutions (Jo 2015; Fazal and Konaev 2019).

IGOs with high economic leverage frequently coordinate with each other in program design, funding, and sanctioning of non-implementation. More memberships therefore yield multiplier effects on stakeholders and implementation. Lastly, the number of memberships is also a proxy for an important "unknown": the degree to which international partners will engage in the country if stakeholders implement the CPA. Memberships capture the *potential* to receive resources. With few or no IGOs engaged in a country, getting access to such resources will be uncertain and depend on ad-hoc decisions by donors. Because stakeholders' fears about low or no implementation (by others) are the central problem around implementation, the potential to receive resources is key to overcoming ex-ante implementation obstacles.[1]

This logic results in hypothesis H1: *CPA implementation proceeds at higher rates in countries participating in more IGOs with high economic leverage, compared to countries with fewer memberships in such IGOs*.

Prior foreign aid

Financial resources *alone* can also help with CPA implementation — if domestic actors can expect that such resources will be received conditional on CPA implementation and post-conflict stabilization. While most foreign aid is not directed toward CPAs, it can supplant implementation

[1] Our data show that for most states, memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage correlates with more resources received.

efforts through several channels. Foreign aid directed toward human development may improve the conditions in which implementation takes place. More aid should be associated with more visible efforts to provide social services, infrastructure, or other support for governing functions. These additional resources can free up capacity for implementation and improve confidence that implementation can succeed, nudging implementing actors and their constituents toward implementation.

Aid committed or disbursed to a country is an investment by donors who are generally interested in reducing violent conflict to maximize the impact of aid (e.g., Gulrajani and Honig 2016; Tir and Karreth 2018). While the literature is inconclusive on whether foreign aid alone can reduce a return to conflict (e.g., Girod 2012; Narang 2014; 2015; Savun and Tirone 2012), in the presence of a CPA aid can have a positive effect on post-conflict peace. Those tasked with implementing CPAs can expect more aid as CPA implementation progresses because donors prefer peace. Failing implementation risks a resurgence of violent conflict (Joshi and Quinn 2017), and donors typically reduce aid during violent conflict (e.g., Balla and Reinhardt 2008; Swedlund 2017). Taken together, this suggests that having received aid in the immediate past can facilitate the current commitment of domestic actors toward implementation. Knowing that lagging implementation may compromise future resources means that those who implement and those who can spoil implementation know that their counterparts' incentives point toward implementation. In contrast, actors in a country that has recently received little foreign aid have less basis to credibly expect that future aid may be forthcoming. Without notable recent investments, there is less to lose for a donor by not engaging with the country even if such promises are made. The lack of a notable past track record of donor involvement leaves no tool to credibly allay fears related to CPA reforms.

Foreign aid-based incentives for CPA implementation apply to those tasked with implementation — including stakeholders beyond national governments. In fact, donors often bypass national governments with aid allocation, especially in fragile contexts (Dietrich 2013), targeting instead non-state actors and local governments. Non-state actors can help facilitate reform by supporting efforts such as reintegration or improving an array of social, economic, and environmental conditions. An influx of resources to their constituents may also make non-state actors less hostile to former government opponents, advancing support for CPA implementation.

A realistic expectation of foreign financial support also shapes the incentives of former anti-government fighters, even if they have not yet received aid themselves. This applies especially if aid is not tied to government actors but bypasses governments and directly goes to local actors or non-governmental organizations. Former opponents can also expect that donors will reduce or withhold aid from governments that slow-walk or cease their implementation efforts. Once again, the hesitation and material obstacles for donors to provide aid to fragile and conflict-affected areas serve to mitigate commitment problems that would hinder CPA implementation. But this process only applies if implementation stakeholders in a country expect that aid will be disbursed if implementation moves forward. Witnessing aid commitments and disbursal in recent years bolsters such an expectation.

Having received more aid in the immediate past is also helpful in practical terms. Countries that have received more aid have more active channels to donors in ministries and other levels of government. NGOs may already exist that can continue and intensify their work when more aid becomes available and CPA implementation moves forward. Post-conflict settings often exhibit a dense network of international and domestic actors working toward peace and security (Braithwaite and Campbell 2020). These networks are more likely to be dense if prior foreign aid already led to an international presence and supported the work of local state and non-state actors.

This argument yields hypothesis H2: *CPA implementation proceeds at higher rates in countries that have received more foreign aid previously, compared to countries that have received less foreign aid.*

Incentives and strategic importance

Incentives are only as powerful as they are credible. The engagement of IGOs with high economic leverage and prior foreign aid both generate credible incentives, as we detail above: the implementation of CPAs is an important policy goal for IGOs and donors, regardless of their political alignment with specific stakeholders. The literature on aid effectiveness in promoting development offers an insightful contrast, reinforcing why third-party incentives can be particularly powerful in the context of CPA implementation. Studies such as Girod (2012) argue that development aid is less effective in promoting post-conflict development in states that are strategically important to donors because recipient governments have no incentives to meet donor goals — and donors tolerate missed goals because they prioritize maintaining ties with a strategically important partner. For CPA implementation, such strategic considerations are unlikely to impact or undermine incentives for implementation. IGOs with high economic leverage are foremost concerned with protecting their projects and ensuring economic performance. It is not likely that recipient states with strategic ties to major country donors can expect continued high levels of assistance from these IGOs even if a CPA implementation process collapses.

Bilateral donors might be more prone than multilateral IGOs to prioritizing strategic considerations, but CPA implementation differs from development goals such infant mortality (Girod 2012) and others. Even a donor with a strong strategic interest in a country cannot "tolerate" the collapse of CPA implementation. A failed CPA (or one with low implementation) usually leads to instability and conflict. For all bilateral donors, conflict in a strategically aligned country creates risks, such as the partner government losing power or territorial control during violence. Therefore, we expect that the incentives derived from having received prior aid and expecting future aid conditional on implementation apply regardless of whether a country is strategically important for a donor not. Similarly, regardless of their identity, donors are likely to continue engaging when CPAs are implemented; this creates a reasonable expectation for stakeholders that aid will continue with CPA implementation.

Quantitative evidence

We analyze CPA implementation progress, 1989-2015, using the *Peace Accords Matrix* (PAM; Joshi, Quinn, and Regan 2015). These data cover 34 CPAs and up to 10 post-conflict years per agreement, for 323 total post-conflict agreement-years with information on covariates. We use PAM's aggregate implementation score: "a normalized annual percentage that ranges from 0 to 100%" (see the PAM codebook for details) that has been used in other work on CPA implementation. Higher rates indicate that at a given point in time, the stakeholders in a post-conflict country had implemented more of the CPA's provisions. Because implementation varies across conflicts *and* across years (see Figure 1), we analyze yearly implementation scores. Conflicts where peace agreements fail and fighting resumes exit the sample at that time.[2] We focus on aggregate implementation because prior work shows that aggregate (rather than specific) implementation is important for post-conflict outcomes and because implementation is phased and dynamic, meaning that only an aggregate score captures what progress has been made relative to milestones.

Empirical strategy

Figure 1 illustrates that CPAs start at different baselines and that implementation also changes over time, suggesting a flexible specification as the most desirable modeling approach. We employ (1) a flexible within-between random effects model as our main estimator following Bell and Jones (2015). This estimator recovers both effects on CPA implementation of changes in IGO memberships/prior foreign aid *within* and *between* countries. In addition, we show estimates of a composite within-between effect using (2) Prais-Winsten feasible generalized least squares with panel-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and panel-corrected standard errors, incorporating a suggestion in Beck and Katz (1995, 637), as well as (3) within-country effect estimates with fixed effects for countries and robust standard errors. Given the upward trend in implementation over time within a conflict, we control for the logged count of post-conflict years; this helps address serially correlated errors. In addition, all these results control for region fixed effects to account for region-specific dynamics that might affect implementation. For each hypothesis, we also (4) instrument the explanatory variable and present results using a 2SLS equation with additional fixed effects for countries and post-conflict years to address concerns about endogeneity driving the results for IGOs or prior aid.

Key explanatory variables

IGO memberships. We measure the influence of IGOs on CPA implementation by counting the number of a country's memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage. These IGOs are formal intergovernmental organizations with centralized administrative infrastructures that can act without the immediate need for consent of all member states. Institutional features include financial authority, decision-making structures independent of immediate member state consent; bureaucratic structures; and formal independence. They also possess economic leverage over member states, across one or more of the following issue areas: trade, currency coordination, economic development, investment, production, and natural resource extraction. This definition follows Karreth (2018). We use the Correlates of War data on states' membership in intergovernmental organizations, version 3.0 (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, McManus, and Jamison 2020) to calculate membership counts in the year before implementation is measured. Post-conflict countries' memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage center at a mean and median of 5. At CPA signing (and afterward), countries in the sample vary considerably in their membership count (Figure A1). We also control for memberships in all other IGOs to distinguish those IGOs with high economic leverage.

Prior foreign aid. For H2, we measure foreign aid to a post-conflict country based on commitments recorded by AidData (AidData 2017). The argument emphasizes a country's prior exposure

[2] Results are similar to what is reported below if these cases are coded as not implemented or dropped.



Figure 1: Implementation scores for 34 comprehensive peace agreements, 1989–2015, covering up to 10 years after each CPA. Source: PAM.

to aid. We average aid amounts over three years prior to the time at which we evaluate CPA implementation and standardize the measure. To emphasize aid as a resource, we use the amount of aid rather than aid as a fraction of GDP, and account for GDP as a covariate.[3]

Control variables

Our analyses control for CPA features that are potentially associated with higher implementation levels. A transitional powersharing government guarantees members of the opposition cabinet-level government positions, and dispute resolution provisions create commissions to address disagreements. We also include an indicator for whether women participated in the negotiation of CPAs in the sample (Krause, Krause, and Bränfors 2018). To account for conflict characteristics being related to implementation, we control for conflict severity using the logged count of battle deaths, the duration of the conflict in years, and for whether a conflict was fought primarily over territory (Allansson, Melander, and Themnér 2017). To measure prior external support for peace processes, we count the number of conflict years with mediation events. We also consider UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) and control for the presence of UN peacekeepers using the logged count of peacekeeping personnel (total and, separately, split into troops and police officers; International Peace Institute 2016).

New leaders might be less likely to continue with implementation, which we measure by including an indicator for leaders representing new support coalitions (Mattes, Leeds, and Matsumura 2016). Our analyses also account for the share of the population excluded from the political process as a proxy for potential spoilers, possibly immune to incentives, that might organize to undermine implementation (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Additional proxies for potential risks of spoilers emerging include the overall population size, and democratic institutions. Economic growth may improve satisfaction with the peace process and, therefore, reduce stakeholder resistance. We control for this factor using the yearly economic growth rate. Natural resources may intensify competition and strengthen constituencies averse to implementation; we control for the presence of hydrocarbons, gemstones, or drugs (Lujala 2010). Economic wealth may facilitate the use of incentives to get conflict parties to negotiate, settle, and implement agreements. At the same time, economic resources, if fungible, can increase the ability of either conflict party to continue fighting, and also make the distribution of resources more difficult. We account for either possible dynamic by including a control for logged GDP per capita before the conflict that led to the CPA. We measure regional volatility and its impact on implementation by including an indicator for a civil war in a neighboring country. Lastly, we use alternate proxies for strategic importance: alliance similarity with the United States, and UN General Assembly ideal point proximity to the United States and OECD countries (Haege 2011; Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten 2017). More detailed information on all control variables are in Tables A3 and A4.

Findings and discussion

Evidence from 34 agreements in 30 countries is consistent with our argument across model specifications:

[3] As an alternative aid measure, we rely on total official aid flows recorded by the OECD (2020) and find similar results in Table A13.

Table 1: Estimates of the association between IGO memberships and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators and Table A5 for coefficients for control variables.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs	(4) HLIGOs instrumented plus country and year FEs
IGOs with high economic leverage (within effect)	18.61* (3.67)		19.12* (4.63)	23.72* (11.66)
IGOs with high economic leverage (between effect)	−1.09 (16.11)			
IGOs with high economic leverage (composite effect)		13.03* (2.85)		
All other IGOs (within effect)	1.26 (6.91)		−0.17 (8.60)	−1.64 (1.03)
All other IGOs (between effect)	1.31 (14.47)			
All other IGOs (composite effect)		−0.15 (4.22)		
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	
Region fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	
Country & Year fixed effects				✓
Num. obs.	323	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

IGO memberships. Joining one additional IGO with high economic leverage is associated with an increase in the CPA implementation rate of about 18 points per year (Table A5), a sizeable increase. This difference is based purely on within-country changes in IGO memberships (Models 1 and 3). It does not capture between-country differences that could be due to other confounders. The finding holds after adjusting for the main determinant of higher implementation rates, the time passed since the CPA was signed, and correcting for potential temporal autocorrelation (Model 2). Only IGOs with high economic leverage show this association; other IGOs are not associated with higher CPA implementation rates.

Control variables and the focus on within-country effects of joining more IGOs with high economic leverage seek to account for any other characteristics influencing CPA implementation. For additional evidence toward H1, instrumental variable (IV) estimates address the possibility of IGO memberships masking other country features that might facilitate CPA implementation as well as IGOs screening out member states that might be fragile or stand low chances of CPA implementation. This IV model is estimated using two-stage least squares and fixed effects for countries and post-conflict years. Any country characteristics and temporal dynamics are absorbed in the fixed effects. As instrument for memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage, we use the average count of memberships in these IGOs of all other countries in that country's region (as defined by the World Bank), excluding the count of the country of interest. This instrument is valid because IGO memberships of other countries in the region are plausibly independent of any events occurring in the conflict country of interest. If country A is considered fragile and a risky member after a conflict, an IGO might not admit country A (or suspend its membership, in rare cases; cf. von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019), but no IGO will plausibly screen out potential future member

Table 2: Regression estimates of the association between prior foreign aid (using aid commitment volumes from AidData) and CPA implementation at the post-CPA year level. Implementation scores range from 2 to 95. See text for detailed description of estimators and Table A7 for coefficients for control variables.

	(1) Within-Between random effects for post-conflict periods	(2) Prais-Winsten FGLS with conflict-specific AR(1) autocorrelation and PCSEs	(3) Country FE and robust SEs	(4) Aid instrumented plus country and year FEs
AidData Foreign aid commitments	6.89*		6.90*	13.11*
(within effect)	(2.47)		(2.73)	(5.05)
AidData Foreign aid commitments	44.06*			
(between effect)	(18.20)			
AidData Foreign aid commitments		6.46*		
(composite effect)		(3.20)		
Control variables	✓	✓	✓	
Region fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	
Country & Year fixed effects				✓
Num. obs.	323	323	323	323

Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test).

states B or C. But because some IGOs with high economic leverage operate only in some regions, it is reasonable to assume and empirically true that regional memberships strongly predict a country's memberships. Therefore, the only plausible path for an association between the regional IGO measure and implementation in a conflict country is through that country's participation in IGOs. Model 4 shows a significant association between the instrumented count of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage. Because of the two-way fixed effects model, the coefficient on IGOs now stands for the average difference in implementation across time periods and countries, not for a given year, and is thus considerably larger.

Prior foreign aid. The data also show a sizeable and significant association between a country's prior receipt of foreign aid and CPA implementation, consistent with H2. As with H1, the empirical estimates uncover the impact of aid independent of wealth before the conflict and of regional differences. This finding is therefore *not* an artefact of a dynamic where implementing countries receive more aid as a reward or countries with higher ex-ante capacity implementing at higher rates. Instead, our main estimates again disaggregate within- and between-country effects. Similar to IGOs, within-effects show that increases in foreign aid prior to an implementation year are associated with higher implementation, about 7 points for a one-standard deviation increase in aid (Table 2). This finding again is robust to corrections for temporal autocorrelation and a pure within-effects specification using fixed effects for countries. Separately, between-effects are large: in comparisons between countries, those receiving more aid also implement at much higher rates, holding observable country and conflict characteristics constant via control variables.

Instrumental variable estimates for aid return similar results in the fourth column of Table 2, using two-stage least squares and fixed effects for countries and post-conflict years. We use the instrument proposed by Dreher and Langlotz (2020), which combines a measure of donor government fractionalization with the probability of a recipient country receiving aid. To align it with our aid variable, we average this instrument over three years and measure it the year before we measure implementation. Because of the two-way fixed effects model, the aid coefficient captures the average difference in implementation across time periods and countries, not for a given year, and is thus considerably larger. Any country characteristics and temporal dynamics are absorbed in the fixed effects.

Control variables. CPAs with dispute resolution committees and verification mechanisms are implemented at higher rates, as are CPAs where women participated in negotiations. Countries with higher wealth before the conflict implement at higher rates. Results for other control variables vary depending on estimators. Some estimates suggest that implementation proceeds more slowly in countries that fought internal wars over territory, in countries with natural resources, and in countries with ongoing civil wars across the border. Larger peacekeeping missions are associated with implementation in several model specifications.[4]

Strategic importance and donor identity. Consistent with our argument, we find that the supporting role of international incentives for CPA implementation holds in the presence of several proxies for countries' strategic importance to the United States and other Western donor countries.[5] We also find no evidence that strategic importance conditions the relationship between prior foreign aid and implementation.[6] Our argument suggests that prior aid supports expectations that facilitate implementation, regardless of strategic importance. As suggested above, all donors are concerned about implementation failure. Therefore, the incentives associated with aid that mitigate implementation hurdles apply regardless of the recipient's strategic importance to the donor. Similarly, we find that no one donor separately affects implementation, consistent with other work (e.g., Donno, Fox, and Kaasik 2022; Mousseau 2021).[7]

Post-treatment bias and model specification. Given potential for post-treatment bias arising from using IGO memberships and aid as predictors, and the lengthy empirical model used, we also present a simple model specification without covariates. Using this specification avoids potential bias in estimates of IGO and aid effects arising from other predictors that might themselves be affected by IGOs and aid. Comparing full results to reduced estimates also ensures that the main findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of control variables. These reduced regressions include only the main predictor (IGO memberships or aid; years since conflict, and region fixed effects). The estimated effect sizes are slightly larger for IGO memberships and about the same for the aid measures (Tables A6 and A8). Within the common constraints of observational data, the consistency of estimates across estimators and model specifications suggests that our findings are not an artifact of estimator choice or confounders.

[4]See Tables A10 and A12 for estimates separating troops and police officers.

[5]See Tables A9 and A11 for alternative proxies.

[6]Results available from the authors.

[7]See Table A14.

The role of IGOs in Ivory Coast

To probe our argument with case evidence, we examine Ivory Coast after 2007. Because Ivory Coast is a typical case (Seawright and Gerring 2008) and as such does not rank exceptionally high on other factors that might facilitate implementation (Figure A2), it offers insights into how the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage and prior foreign aid can help overcome obstacles to CPA implementation. As a contrast, the next section also offers a short discussion of the "negative" case of the 1993 Arusha Accords in Rwanda, where a lack of international incentives prohibited more successful implementation.

Ivory Coast enters our sample with the March 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA), ending a civil war that had started in 2002. The agreement was signed by the government of Laurent Gbagbo and the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI/FNCI) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. This truly comprehensive peace agreement tackled a multitude of contentious issues and provided a framework for a transition to peace. It covered issues such as the cease fire; power-sharing; transitional government; demobilization; electoral, civil administration, military, police, and citizenship reforms; reintegration; amnesty; and internally displaced persons (S17).[8] Because the CPA covers so many issues, opportunities for stakeholders and potential spoilers to block implementation abound — setting up a useful scenario for learning about how effective incentives can be.

Per our theory, given the country's high count of memberships in IGOs with high economic leverage (8 in 2007) and prior record of receiving aid, its CPA should see a comparatively high rate of implementation. The increase in aid during successful implementation (Figure A3) also illustrates the within-country changes we emphasize in the quantitative findings above. Notably, the increase in aid over time is *not* a response to successful implementation; the values here capture aid averaged over three years prior to the year shown in the figure — just as in the regressions above. If our theory is correct, prior and, then, implementation-dependent third-party support via foreign aid and the engagement of IGOs with high economic leverage addressed both material obstacles to implementation as well as stakeholder resistance and concerns about domestic rivals' commitment to implementation.

Implementing the OPA started off well (Figure 1), with goodwill political steps and the dismantling of a buffer zone that had split the country into a northern and southern region. But the World Bank (one IGO with high economic leverage) quickly realized that "the full plan cannot be implemented comprehensively because of lack of funding for the other key elements" (S29:1). The comprehensive nature of the agreement made it costly to implement, at about 140 billion CFA francs (S2). The government thought that it could cover just over one-third of the cost, or about 49 billion CFA francs (ibid.). This immediately raised concerns that implementing the OPA would result in only makeshift solutions, which in turn would fail to consolidate the peace and increase the chances of conflict resumption. Observers pointed out that "the individual calculations of the signatories do not necessarily bode well for a comprehensive settlement of the crisis" (S3: 19). In response to such assessments, the International Crisis Group issued a call to the international community to "rapidly provide financial and technical assistance as needed by the government to execute fully all operations pertaining to the OPA" (S10; see also S2; S3). This is consistent with our argument pointing to lack of resources leading to an *inability* to implement, and providing

[8] Citations for all sources labeled S are in the SI.

resources as key to implementation.

Led by IGOs with high economic leverage such as the World Bank, IMF, and ECOWAS, the international community responded quickly. The World Bank met with the disputants "to develop operational plans and budget for dismantling militias, cantonment of combatants, restarting state-administrative activities" (S21: 3-4); "to assist the national institutions in the planning and implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme" (p.14); and to assist in "mobilizing resources needed for the reintegration and civic service programmes" (p. 15). The Bank immediately provided US$120 million to support these goals. The IMF provided US$62.2 "to help Côte d'Ivoire build the foundation for sustained recovery in an environment of improving security, regain political stability, and reunite the country" (S6: 1). IGOs were of course not the only actors supplying material aid to Ivory Coast. Bilateral donors showed similar engagement following the OPA (OECD 2020), focusing on implementation and other targets. Due to the lagged measure we use, this spike shows up Figure A3 in 2010 and afterward.

Following these financial assistance efforts in 2007, in 2008 ECOWAS (and the EU as a donor) provided resources to help the state electoral commission restore records (S25), an important task given the OPA's agenda of electoral reform and considering that some of the main points of contention in the war were citizenship and voting eligibility. Furthermore, in 2009, the same entities provided US$95 million to help the government in implementing the peace agreement through provisions for elections, redeployment of state administration, return of internally displaced persons, and socialization programs for former combatants (S26). The World Bank and IMF provided budgetary support of US$100 and US$150 million (S26), respectively, while ECOWAS and the World Bank contributed to the implementation activities relating to the reconciliation and former combatants dialogue efforts (S27). In 2010, for instance, the World Bank (and EU) provided support to assist with "the rehabilitation and equipping of administrative, court and penitentiary facilities" as specified in the OPA (S28: 17).

These examples show clear evidence of material support to Ivory Coast toward implementation of the OPA. Many of these resources connect to deep and extensive IGO involvement. In particular, IGOs with high economic leverage targeted these resources to many specific programs implementing the OPA, ranging from reconciliation efforts and DDR to civic service initiatives. These efforts fit well with our assertion that IGOs with high economic leverage have a long-term self-interest in member state peace and stability. A civil war country needs to return to peace for these IGOs to be able to continue their missions, which typically relate to the issues of economic development, growth, and trade. IGOs with high economic leverage are therefore willing to invest substantial resources in order to see the member country turn a CPA into lasting peace. World Bank documents identify the rationale of targeted funding being critical to addressing key conflict-causing issues, whose resolution is necessary for peace consolidation:

> "The proposed support will help respond to the situation by providing funding for: (a) the economic (re)integration of ex-combatants, individuals associated with armed groups, and of youth-at-risk more in general; (b) the national identification process, including the modernization of the national civil registry, which is a pre-condition not only for free and fair elections but also for restoring equitable access to social services; (c) the rehabilitation and re-equipment of social and economic infrastructure in the communities most affected by conflict, and (d) the strengthening of social capital throughout the country. This is expected to have a significant impact on improving the

chances for sustainable peace by: addressing one of the key causes of the conflict ("national identity" manifest through official identification and registry), encouraging vulnerable groups such as youth associated with conflict to resume productive lives, improving access to basic social services, and enhancing the implementation capacity of community-based development organizations." (S29: 1)

...

"Targeted support by the Bank at this critical juncture will facilitate the stabilization of the improved but fragile situation, helping to create conditions under which the country can resume pro-poor social and economic development and begin to mend the social divisions that deepened over the past four years. [...] By supporting key chapters of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement, this project will not only respond to emergency needs but also address the deep-rooted causes of conflict and therefore contribute to the prevention of further conflict." (S29: 3)

IGOs with high economic leverage also took an active role in monitoring implementation and released further resources only once they ascertained progress. The World Bank prepared progress reports on the OPA twice a year (S29), noting for example that "[i]mplementation of the proposed project is a critical element in the sequence of ... [actions to] allow for the successful resumption of other projects in the Bank portfolio" (S29: 4). This sequential and contingent release of funds is key to structuring incentives for government and former rebels to honor promises they have made to avoid reneging on peace agreement terms and work toward OPA implementation. Without such a conditional, sequential incentive structure, temptations to renege or succumb to internal resistance to reforms would have been much greater — and the former foes would very likely have fallen into the all-too-familiar credible commitment trap. Accordingly, beyond regular meetings with the government and ex-rebel leaders, the World Bank sent in experts to review implementation requirements and progress (S22; S23). Pending promising results for, for example, the reinsertion and community rehabilitation program focusing on demobilized combatants, to which the World Bank contributed US$40 million, the Bank approved three additional projects worth US$126 million to deal with institution building, governance, reconstruction, and health (S24).

The government understood quite clearly that to receive further IGO funds it needed to continue to meet various OPA implementation benchmarks. For example, "[t]he authorities recognized that early progress in implementing the Ouagadougou Accord and demonstrating improvements in governance, particularly in public finances and the energy and cocoa/coffee sectors, were important first steps in gaining donor and private sector support" (S6: 21). A letter from Prime Minister Soro and Minister of Economy and Finance Charles Koffi Diby to the Managing Director of the IMF states that "[t]he government is determined to complete the reunification of the country quickly and to implement the other aspects of the roadmap.... The support of the [IMF] ... is of crucial importance during this pivotal period" (S7: 34). Similarly, Lauren Rutayisire, the IMF's Executive Director for Côte d'Ivoire, notes that "[g]oing forward, my authorities are committed to implementing all the remaining activities of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord . ... The continuous assistance of the international community is key in accompanying this momentum [and] my authorities will appreciate the Board's support for an additional assistance under the IMF's EPCA program." (S7: 96).

This pattern of government compliance with implementation and contingent, sequential provision of IGO funds worked well initially. By 2010, the OPA implementation rate climbed to 65 percent, with most specific OPA accord provisions starting to reach intermediate levels of implementation (S17). But things deteriorated in December 2010 when Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede the presidency to Alassane Ouattara after an apparent election loss (S18). The international community's reaction to the election dispute and ensuing sporadic violence was relatively quick, prolific, and largely united in pressing Gbagbo to recognize the election result (S11). Condemnations, visa bans, membership suspensions, and the like came from organizations to which Ivory Coast was a member, such as the African Union and the UN, as well as powerful third-party organizations such as the EU. Though high-profile, these efforts proved largely ineffective in convincing Gbagbo to give up power. The violence instead intensified (S1; S12).

Working behind the scenes of high-profile attempts to resolve the crisis, IGO actions were probably the most effective in ending the violence (Tir and Karreth 2018). Through its BCEAO (the Central Bank of West African States) and UEMOA (the West African Economic and Monetary Union) arms, ECOWAS suspended Gbagbo's access to state funds (S4; S5).[9] Similarly, the World Bank and IMF suspended disbursement of already committed funds, around US$313 million and US$220, respectively (S8; S19; S30). Following these signals, major foreign banks (e.g., Société Générale, Citibank, BNP Paribas, and Standard Chartered) ceased operations in Ivory Coast (S20).

These moves — along with economic sanctions imposed by the EU and other international actors — led Gbagbo quickly run out of funds to pay his government and, most critically, the military (S20). Mass desertions including officers and generals followed (S13; S14). The disintegration of Gbagbo's forces undermined his ability to keep control of the presidency. Pro-Ouattara forces arrested him in April 2011.[10] Gbagbo's arrest resulted in the situation stabilizing quickly and, notably, making for a much shorter and less lethal conflict than many observers had initially expected (S15; S16).

The parallel actions by IGOs, France, other donors, and private actors also illustrates how ties to IGOs and prior aid resources create an incentive for third parties to prevent a breakdown of the peace agreement. In part to help maintain the newfound stability and to incentivize the return to implementing the OPA's terms, the IMF and World Bank soon resumed their programs in the country, pledging US$4 billion (S9). France, the largest bilateral donor, granted several hundred million US$ intended toward funding government operations and social services (S31). The previous pattern of OPA implementation, followed by contingent and sequential release of further resources, resumed. OPA implementation scores started to rise again, reaching 83 percent by 2016 and showing intermediate to full levels of implementation of most provisions (S17).

The 2010-11 events provide a hard test of the role of third-party support, especially IGOs with high economic leverage, to help implement the terms of the OPA. The events show that it is possible for the government to attempt to renege on the terms it has agreed to, such as holding and respecting the outcome of elections. Butthird parties that have previously committed resources to a country can effectively exercise pressure on stakeholders when implementation halts and the risk of violent conflict rises. While a skeptic may argue that international third parties failed to completely deter government misbehavior, such attempts are nevertheless ultimately miscalculations.

[9] BCEAO serves as the country's and region's central bank.

[10] French helicopters assisted with securing the area around the Gbagbo residence but did not intervene in the arrest themselves (S16).

Connections to IGOs with high economic leverage and prior engagement of donor countries both create powerful incentives for third parties to push for implementation and even intervene to ensure its continuation, as Gbagbo and his allies came to experience.

Challenges to implementation in Rwanda

Rwanda in the 1990s offers contrasting insights into how a lack of international incentives and support can create and exacerbate severe obstacles to implementation. While the genocide in 1994 is strong evidence for the failure of the 1993 Arusha Accord to prevent conflict recurrence, implementation already lagged other comparable CPAs before the genocide (Figure 1). Consistent with our argument, Rwanda ranks lower than Ivory Coast on our key explanatory variables. Ivory Coast participated in more IGOs with high economic leverage than Rwanda, and Rwanda also received less aid than Ivory Coast in the years prior to the CPA. This suggests a lesser precedent for credible international incentives and fewer resources that might help overcome early implementation obstacles in particular.[11]

Additional evidence suggests that a lack of potential and actual resources in Rwanda were detrimental for CPA implementation especially early on. This lack of resources slowed down implementation and frustrated potential spoilers, raising the risk of non-cooperation with implementation provisions. The Rwandan government lacked funds for the transitional government and there was no strong presence of international actors to lend support. As an example, Major Brent Beardsley (military assistant to UNAMIR force commander) stated that the IMF, World Bank, and UN would not give money to pay for the pensions of the soldiers that were to be sent to the demobilization camps (Warden 2016, 42; S39). This resource problem quickly turned into an implementation problem because it pushed stakeholders into the arms of those opposing the CPA and its conditions. Other accounts also mention a lack of resources for implementation as a key challenge that invited and empowered spoilers (S32). Another source suggests that a massive, but sudden increase in development aid to the government may have suggested to the government that it could "get away" with slowing down implementation (S33). This highlights our argument's focus on the importance of *prior* aid to assert the credibility of third-party incentives. Multiple sources also accuse the IGOs and donors that *were* involved in Rwanda at the time to be ignorant about Rwanda's political scene and which groups might emerge as spoilers (S34), and misinterpreting "apparent" progress on implementation (S36). As our argument suggests, this lack of understanding of local context is particularly likely when IGOs and donors have no extensive prior presence in the country. A critical review of development donors' work in Rwanda at the time also notes a lack of a longer-term presence and framework of IGOs and donors as a key source of why the efforts that *were* deployed failed (S36). A coordination problem between donors (S38) was likely exacerbated by a lack of (1) prior engagement, (2) clear resulting structures, and (3) prior experience of coordinating collaboration in Rwanda. These specific points and the Rwandan experience in general are consistent with our argument that an established presence of *prior* aid, not a sudden massive increase during implementation, can overcome commitment problems around implementation.

[11] The SI contains a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of the Rwandan case.

Conclusion

This study asks why implementation of the most impactful type of peace agreements varies in post-conflict countries. We propose that credible prospects of resources to post-conflict countries are particularly well placed to overcome stakeholder resistance to CPA implementation. Quantitative evidence is consistent with this argument. Across 34 CPAs since 1989, we find higher implementation rates (1) in countries with extensive ties to IGOs with high economic leverage that can provide incentives and guarantees, and otherwise facilitate the buy-in of relevant stakeholders for implementation, and (2) when countries have previously had access to higher volumes of foreign aid. Both trends are independent of baseline wealth or regional patterns in capacity or fragility.

These findings have implications for practical peacebuilding and for preventing conflict recurrence. The evidence suggests that the economic leverage of IGOs, where present, helps CPA implementation. For mediators and other third parties facilitating peace agreements, this leads to two suggestions. On the one hand, efforts may be more promising in contexts where IGOs and donors can credibly back up the efforts needed to implement CPAs. On the other hand, an extension of the argument implies that directly harnessing the influence of IGOs with high economic leverage and coordinating CPA design and implementation support with these IGOs is a worthwhile avenue. We also emphasize one facet of aid effectiveness with considerable downstream implications: the positive impacts of well-implemented CPAs are well documented.

For scholarly work on peace agreement implementation and long-term prospect for peace, our study highlights IGOs with high economic leverage as a key third party with qualities distinct from other third parties. This emphasis comports well with a recent literature on the role of external actors for conflict termination and prevention (e.g., Beardsley, Cunningham, and White 2017; Sawyer, Cunningham, and Reed 2017; Tir and Karreth 2018). Our study also adds to growing evidence that IGOs have impacts well beyond their initial mandates, initially framed as a "pathology" (Barnett and Finnemore 1999), and more recently documented in a variety of contexts (Johnson 2014). However, as suggested in Tir and Karreth (2018), this influence of IGOs beyond their core mandate need not always be negative. We emphasize in particular the importance of institutional structures and of distinguishing between different types of IGOs. This supplants other recent work on the role of IGOs for domestic political contention (von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019; Breslawski and Cunningham 2019), but also provides further opportunities for examining how institutional structures can be linked to concrete negotiation behavior and post-conflict outcomes. Consistent with Matanock (2020), the findings on IGOs and foreign aid jointly suggest that material resources from third parties can bolster fragile domestic arrangements and enhance commitments to peace agreement implementation in a way that other third parties cannot.

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